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*hen, f at all,shouldcourts make agenciesfollow the President's
'.:ersonal"policiesdeclaredin non-statutoryexecutive orders? Professor Raven-Hansenhere seeks an answer by making the caseforgeneral
judicialenforceability of Executive Order No. 12,291, which requires
regulatory impact analysis of major rules. He concludes that a nonstatutory executive order which is not mere housekeeping can bind
agencies under the principle that they mustfollow their own rules, but
that the committal ofenforcement to executive discretionis often a serious obstacle tojudicialenforceability. Whether such discretionbarsjudicial review altogetheror only narrows the scope of review, however,
dependsupon the O)cacy of executive enforcement andits compatibility
wity judicialenforcement.
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V.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Executive orders are presidential policy directives to the federal

bureaucracy.' Most executive orders implement legislative policies
2
pursuant to specific grants of statutory authority to the President.
Some important executive orders, however, implement what is essentially executive managerial policy pursuant to the President's in-

dependent authority under the Constitution and unspecified "laws of
the United States," or to vague, general statutory grants of housekeeping or managerial authority. 3 Although these managerial executive or-

ders are addressed to public officials, they may indirectly affect private
interests through the actions of such officials. For example, executive
orders prohibiting discrimination in federal procurement and employment,4 extending collective bargaining or other employment rights to
the federal work force, 5 or imposing controls on administrative
1. See Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of PresidentialLegislation, 40
LAW & CoNTEmp. PRoDs. (1976) 1, 7-9; Note, PresidentialPower Use andEnforcement of Executive Orders,39 NoTRE DAME LAw. 44 (1963). See generally Noyes, Executive Orders,Presidential
Iatent, and PrvateRights of(Actions, 59 Tax L. REv. 837, 839.42 (1981) (describing nature and
examples of executive orders).
2. See R. MORGAN, THE PRESIDENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS 5 (1970) (83% of executive orders

from 1945 to 1965 were issued upon specific statutory authority).
3. See infra notes 4-6.
4. Exec. Order No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.),reprintedas amendedin 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000c app. at 1232-36 (1976) & at 591-93 (Supp. IV 1980). The preamble of this order cites
simply "the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and
statutes of the United States."
5. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 Comp.), superseded by Exec. Order No.
11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-70 Comp.), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976). The preamble to this
order cited "the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States, by section 1753 of
the Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. § 631), and as President of the United States." The cited statutory
provision generally authorizes rulemaking for the governance of the federal work force, but
neither states any legislative policy nor provides any specific foundation for the order. Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dictum), cert.denied,
382 U.S. 978 (1966). But . Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,273 n.5 (1974)
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rulemaking 6 may affect the interests of federal contractors and their
employees, federal workers, and persons subject to administrative regulations, respectively. In the past, persons substantially prejudiced by
agency violations of managerial executive orders have asked the courts
to enforce the orders by setting aside noncomplying agency action.
The courts normally have refused such requests. 7 Although their
reasons for denying review have varied, the decisions display a shared
doubt of the propriety, if not the legality, of judicial review of "intraexecutive operations" governed by an executive order.3 An unarticulated fear of trespassing on the President's "personal" 9 domain in
breach of the separation of powers seems to fuel this doubt, even
(finding sufficient foundation for Exec. Order No. 11,491 in comparable statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7301
(1976), for that order to pre-empt inconsistent state laws through the supremacy clause).
6. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 17 (1982), reprinedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 135
(Supp. V 1982) ("Reagan Order") [hereinafter reference to U.S.C. will be omitted]. The preamble
to this order cites "the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and Laws of the
United States."
7. See, eg., Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975) (order not
enforceable as law), cat dented, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Kuhl v. Hampton, 451 F.2d 340, 342 (8th
Cir. 1971) (no private right of action or subject matter jurisdiction to review agency compliance,
which involves unreviewable agency discretion); Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th
Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.) (dictum) (agency compliance involves unreviewable agency discretion),
cet denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 456
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (dictum) (implied preclusion of judicial review of agency compliance), cert. dened, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1387-89 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(order not enforceable as law); American Meat Inst. v. Bergland, 459 F. Supp. 1308, 1315 (D.D.C.
1978) (dictum) (order not intended to provide grounds for judicial review); Hiatt Grain & Feed,
Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457,501-02 (D. Kan. 1978) (order not enforceable as law), a'd,602
F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979), cerm dented, 444 US. 1073 (1980). Many of these decisions cite and are
cited interchangeably with decisions refuinng to hear claims that private parties have violated
executive orders. See, eg., Local 1498 v. AFGE, 522 F.2d 486,491 (3d Cir. 1975) (no jurisdiction
over action complaining of private non-compliance because order lacked force and effect of law);
Stevens v. Carey, 483 F.2d.188, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1973) (no jurisdiction over action complaining of
private non-compliance because order only contemplated administrative remedy); Farkas v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629,632-33 (5th Cir.) (implied preclusion ofjudicial review of private
non-compliance), cat dented, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3,
8-9 (3d Cir. 1964) (dictum) (no implied federal cause of action for private non-compliance); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 343 F. Supp. 836, 840 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (no implied federal cause
of action for private non-compliance), vacaedandrenwmdadonothergrounds,477 F.2d I (3d Cir.
1973).
& Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 354 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("The Executive Branch
is traditionally free to handle its internal problems of administration in its own way."). The majority in this case concluded that agency action in excess of authority delegated by executive order
was invalid, but did not purport to review agency compliance with the order.
9. Sm Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 n.21 (8th Cir. 1975)
(purpoee of predecessor to Reagan Order is only "to help implement the President's personal
economic policies"), cm. daded, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (executive order regarding collective bargaining by
federal employees only implements a "personal policy" and "project of the [eixecutive"), cet
dented, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
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though judicial review of agency compliance with executive orders
would likely require direct review of only agency action and not of the

President's actions.' 0 As a result, what has emerged from the cases is
an ill-defined Presidential "para-law"" which has uncertain legal effect
and which is apparently unenforceable by affected private parties.
This article attempts to clarify whether and when courts should

make agencies follow executive orders. It pursues this goal by exploring in detail the case for judicial review of agency violations of a recent
managerial executive order, Executive Order No. 12,29112 (the Reagan
Order). The Reagan Order forbids non-independent agencies,' 3 to the

extent permitted by their enabling statutes, from issuing regulations unless the benefits outweigh the costs 14 of these regulations. This costbenefit analysis is intended to reduce regulatory burdens and to ensure

well-reasoned regulations.15 Agencies must perform this analysis on
"major rules"' 6 in a "Regulatory Impact Analysis" (RIA) that must be
approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and dis10. Direct review is required by attacks on the legality of executive orders in which courts are
asked to review the President's compliance with legislative policies or with constitutional grants of
authority, but even in such cases, a deferential adjustment of the scope of review may be required
out of respect for the separation of powers. See generally Bruff, JudicalReview andthe President's
StatutoryPowers, 68 VA. L. REv. 1 (1982); Hochman, J"udalReview ofAdmiistrative Processes
in Which the PresidentPaticpates,74 HARv. L. REv. 684 (1961); Note, JudicialReview ofExecu.
tiveAction &i DomesticAffairs, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 1535 (1980). [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicia
Review of Executive Action ].
11. Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 1, at 40.
12. 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
13. The independent regulatory agencies, as defined by 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (Supp. IV
1976), are exempt from the Order. Reagan Order, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). The Vice President, however, in his capacity as Director of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, has
requested that the independent agencies voluntarily comply with the provisions of the Order. Letter from George Bush to the Independent Agencies (March 25, 1981) (copy on file with the
author).
14. Reagan Order, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982); see infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
15. Reagan Order, Preamble, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). The Preamble also states that the Order is
intended to increase agency accountability, to provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory
process, and to minimize regulatory duplication and conflict.
16. A "major rule" is a regulation which is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy

of $100 million or more, major cost or price increases in particular sectors of the economy, or
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation or
American ability to compete with foreign enterprises. Id § I (b), 3 C.F.R. 127-28 (1982). Although the Orders substantive requirements theoretically apply to "minor" as well as "major"
rules, the Administration believed that preparation of RJIAs for the former would not justify the
cost. U.S. REGULATORY CouNcIL, A SuRVEY OF TEN AGENICES' EXPERIENCE wrrH REGuLAToRY ANALYsis 12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. REGULATORY COuNCIL]. The limited impact
of minor rules makes it probable that they will be challenged less often than major rules, and lack
of an RIA would ordinarily make it difficult to base even the rare challenge on asserted violations
of the Order. Accordingly, this article focuses solely on the case for judicial review of agency
violations of the Order in connection with major rules.
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closed to the public.'7 The Reagan Order thus requires cost-sensitive
regulatory decision making for major rules just as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires environmentally sensitive deci-

sion making for major administrative actions.18 The RIA, like an
Environmental Impact Statement under the NEPA, evidences that "the
mandated decision making process has in fact taken place and... allows those removed from the initial process to evaluate and balance the

factors on their own."' 9
One might therefore expect a person aggrieved by a major rule to
challenge the rule's validity on the ground that the agency had not
complied with the Reagan Order's decision making process.20 The
Reagan Order emphasizes, however, that it is "intended only to improve the internal management of the federal government, and is not
intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States." 21 Judicial rea17. Reagan Order, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 128-29 (1982); see infra notes 32-33, 41-44 and accompanying text.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4333, 4341, 4345 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generall, F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973).
19. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
20. A party could assert a claim that an agency has violated the Reagan Order in four settings. First, and most commonly, the party could assert the claim in an action for pre-enforcement
review of a major rule. See Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975)
(claim that final regulations were invalid because of deficiencies in accompanying economic analysis required by executive order), cert denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976). Second, the party could assert

the claim as a defense to an enforcement proceeding in which defendant is charged with violating
a major rule. Cf.United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (noncompliance

with executive order asserted as defense to criminal prosecution). Third, the party could assert the
claim in an action challenging an agency's decision not to issue a major rule because it found that

the rule does not meet the requirements of the Reagan Order. Finally, the party could assert the
claim in an action challenging an agency's decision to rescind a major rule because it found that
the rule does not meet the requirements of the Reagan Order. The review of agency inaction or
rule rescission poses difficult questions concerning finality, the record for review, agency rulemaking discretion, and scope of review, questions that are not unique to executive orders and lie
beyond the scope of this article. See, eg., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683
F.2d 752,760-61 (3d Cir. 1982) (indefinite postponement of final rule for further economic analysis); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DOT, 680 F.2d 206,218-22 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rescission of
rule), vacated, 51 U.S.L.W. 4953 (U.S. June 21, 1983); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818-19
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (denial of rulemaking petition); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v. SEC,
606 F.2d 1031, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (termination of rulemaking without issuance of a rule);
see also Rockford League of Women Voters v. NRC, 679 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982) ("pure"
regulatory inaction). The record problems that such cases sometimes pose are alleviated, however,
when the agency inaction or rescission is based upon an RIA.
21. Reagan Order, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 133-34 (1982). Of course, the Reagan Order does not and
could not preclude review of its own legality. See Bruff PreddentialPower andAdmhztrative
Pdemakig, 88 YALE LJ.451, 506 (1979); OFFICE OF LEoAL COUNSEL,U.S. DEP'T OF JusrcE,
MEMORANDUM RE: PROPOSED ExEcutvE ORiDER ENTITLED 'FEDERAL REOULATIONs' (Feb. 13,
1OR!) [hereinafter cited as OLC MEMORANDUM] (copy on file with author). In addition, if a
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soning that managerial executive orders do not create judicially
cognizable "law" and that, in any case, aggrieved persons might not
have standing or a cause of action to enforce such orders, provides the
basis for the attempted preclusion of judicial review of agency viola22
tions of the Order.
The Reagan Order thus presents a particularly hard case for judicial enforcement. 23 Yet for this very reason it permits exploration of
the common grounds for denying judicial review. Although these
grounds overlap substantially, the courts have traditionally treated
them separately. Courts distinguish the merits-whether an agency is
bound by an executive order-from the requirements that must be satisfied before the court will reach the merits, requirements such as jurisdiction, standing, existence of a cause of action, and reviewability. 24 In
regulatory enabling statute independently requires some form of analytic justification for an administrative regulation and permits judicial review, then an RIA may be combined with such a
justification and reviewed by the courts as part of the statutorily prescribed review of the final
regulation. Cf Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 333 n.120 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (economic impact
analysis required by statute and executive order).
22. The OLC cited Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976), as the basis for the preclusion provision of the Reagan Order.
See OLC MEMORANDUM, supra note 21, at 12-13. At issue in Independent Meat Packers was the
agency's compliance with a predecessor to the Reagan Order, Executive Order No. 11,821, 3
C.F.R. 926 (1971-75 Comp.), reprinedin 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976), extendedand name changedby
Executive Order No. 11,949,3 C.F.R. 161 (1977) ("Ford Order"). The court found that the Ford
Order "was intended primarily as a managerial tool for implementing the President's personal
economic policies and not as a legal framework enforceable by private civil action." Independent
Meat Packers, 526 F.2d at 236.
23. The Reagan Order's uncertain legal status complicates the case. The legality of the Reagan Order has been sharply contested, see, e.g., Rosenberg, Bend the Limits of Executive Power:
PresidentialControl ofAgency Rulemaking Under Executive Order12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193
(1981); Symposhr Cost-Benei Anayfr andAgency Decrl'on.Making An Analysis 0/'Executive
Order No. 12,291,23 AiZ. L. REv. 1195 (1981); Comment, Capitalizingon a CongressionalVoldExecutive Order12,291, 31 Am. U.L. Rav. 613 (1982). Also, the Order's relationship to particular
regulatory enabling statutes is still uncertain. See infra note 38. Though the Order applies only
"to the extent permitted by law," Reagan Order, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1981), the OMB has consistently declined to identify which statutes permit and which prohibit the Order's application. ALLIANCE FOR JUSiCE, UNDERMINNG

PuBLIc PROTECTIONs: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

REGULATORY PRoGRAM 58 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE]. This article as-

sumes that the Reagan Order is lawful and considers the analytically distinctive questions of its
binding effect and private enforceability. Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 n.40
(1979) (validity of regulations and executive order under which they were promulgated is a separate question from their effect as "law").
24. Analytically, the distinctions between the merits of a claim against the government,
standing, and a cause of action tend to blur. See D. CuRwE, FEDRmAL Coum'rS 60 (1982); 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MIL.E & B. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 181-82
(1975). Several commentators have argued for a merger of the current test for standing to review
administrative actions, the merits, and the test for a cause of action. See Albert, Standing to Chal.
lenge Admintrative Action" An Inadequate Surrogate/or Claimfor Reli#', 83 YALE LJ. 425
(1974); Marquis, The Zone ofInterests Component of the FederalStandng Ruler: Alive and Well
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evaluating the grounds for denying review, this article accepts the
traditional framework of analysis for judicial review of administrative
action. The provisions of the Reagan Order are described in Part II;
Part III discusses the merits of a claim that an agency has violated the
Order, and Part IV discusses the threshold requirements for review of
the claim, in light of the merits.
The analysis shows that although the Reagan Order lacks the force
and effect of law, it nevertheless serves as a rule that binds the agencies
because of the doctrine that agencies must follow those rules that go
beyond mere regulation of internal housekeeping. The analysis also
shows that there are often independent bases for satisfying the threshold requirements for judicial review of agency action-jurisdiction,
standing, and cause of action-which a plaintiff can properly append
the claim that an agency has violated the Reagan Order. Moreover, it
appears doubtful that the executive branch can preclude judicial review
of that claim by fiat. The most serious obstacle to review is therefore
the argument that compliance with the Order is a matter committed to
the unreviewable discretion of the executive branch.
Narrowing the scope of review instead of withholding review,
however, accommodates most of the concerns underlying this argument. Consequently where the OMB has not waived the Order's requirements, a narrowly confined, deferential review should be
available for claims of agency violation of the Reagan Order. Drawing
on this analysis of the Reagan Order, the article suggests a framework
for analyzing whether and when courts should make agencies follow
other managerial executive orders.
II. THE PROviSIONS OF THE REAGAN ORDER

The Reagan Order is another step in the evolution of executive
oversight of the regulatory process.25 Every President since Richard
After.ll? 4 U. ARK. LrrrLERocK LJ.261, 286 (1981). The courts have yet to adopt this view,
however.
Some cases also treat the question of reviewability as an aspect of standing. See, ag., Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But
other cases have treated these requirements as distinct, finding a claim unreviewable after concluding that the plaintiff had standing to raise it. See, g., Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). In any event, whether reviewability is a separate inquiry or a "prong" of a standing
test, it raises special institutional concerns, apart from the status of the plaintifl that justify separate analysis. This article, therefore, analyzes reviewability separately.
25. See Shane,APrdA* Reguatory Overightand the SeparationofPowe= The Constitudonaliy of Execzaive OrderNo. 12,291, 23 ARmu L REv. 1235, 1235 (1981).
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Nixon26 has sought to encourage the use of some degree of economic
analysis, subject to centralized executive oversight, 27 in the regulatory
process. The Reagan Order, like its predecessors, contains reporting,
substantive, and managerial provisions, 28 however, it also makes significant departures from prior executive orders.
As was true under Executive Order No. 11,821 of President Ford
(the Ford Order)29 and Executive Order No. 12,044 of President Carter
(the Carter Order),30 an agency determination that a proposed rule is
"major", based on the rule's annual effect on the national economy as a
whole or on particular sectors or aspects of the economy,3 1 triggers the
key reporting provisions of the Reagan Order. For each major rule, an
agency must prepare and forward to the OMB an RIA that describes
the potential costs and benefits of the rule, their incidence, and alternative approaches that might achieve the same goals at lower cost. The
RIA must also explain reasons why the rule cannot comply with the
substantive requirements of the Order.32 The Order also provides for
26. Infact, the centralized imposition of analytic decision making procedures on federal departments and agencies can be traced back even further than the Nixon administration to the
adoption of the "Planning-Programming-Budgeting System," or PPBS, by the Bureau of the
Budget in the Johnson administration. See Held, PPBS Comes to Washington, 4 PuB. INTEREST
102 (1966). PPBS anticipated some features of later executive orders by requiring, as part of the
budgetary process, the analysis of alternative ways to achieve programmatic objectives. 1d at 107;
see F. LYDEN & E. MILLER, PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BuDGTINo: A SYsTEMs APPROACH TO
MANAGEMENT (1969). The analytic methods included cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness
analysis, both of which are implicitly endorsed by the Reagan Order. Reagan Order, § 2(b)-(d)
3(d), 3 C.F.R. 128-29 (1982). For a general review of the literature on presidential control of
rulemaking, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.40, at 147 (Supp. 1982).
27. Interagency "Quality of Life" review of environmental regulations in the Nixon Administration, see generally J. QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 117-42 (1976), was followed by the Ford Order, which

required executive agencies to prepare "Inflation Impact Statements" certifying that they had considered the inflationary impact of "major" legislative and regulatory proposals. Ford Order, supra
note 22. See generally BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSES OF SOCIAL REGULATION (J.Miller & B. Yandle
eds. 1979). The Council on Wage and Price Stability reviewed the "Inflation Impact Statements,"
later called "Economic Impact Statements," although its enforcement role under the Ford Order
was purely hortatory. By Executive Order 12,044, President Carter also required regulatory analysis of the "economic consequences" of major regulatory rules and alternatives. This analysis was
subject to centralized, but still essentially hortatory review by a Regulatory Analysis Review
Group chaired by the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and staffed by the Council
on Wage and Price Stability. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 app. at 107-09 (Supp. 11 1979). (Carter Order). See generally L WHITE, REFORMING REoULATION: PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS 13-26 (1981).

28.
porting,
29.
30.
31.
32.

Professor Shane suggested subdividing the Reagan Order for analytic purposes into resubstantive, and managerial requirements. Shane, supra note 25, at 1238.
Ford Order, supra note 22.
Carter Order, supra note 27.
Seenqpra note 16.
Reagan Order, § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. 129 (1982).
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publication, in the FederalRegister, of preliminary and final RIAs and
of determinations of the legal and factual support for each final major
33
rule.
The heart of the Reagan Order and its principal break with the
past lies in the substantive provisions of section two. Section two compels agencies, "to the extent permitted by law," to meet certain requirements in promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing regulations,
and developing legislative proposals concerning regulation. These include the cost-benefit requirement that "the potential benefits to society
for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society" and the costeffectiveness requirement that the regulatory alternative "involving the
least net cost to society shall be chosen." 34
Prior executive orders urged the consideration of costs or economic consequences simply as a-guide to rational regulatory decision
making. The Reagan Order, however, makes this consideration determinative in the decision to promulgate rules. The Order expressly
commands that "[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken 35 unless
the cost-benefit requirement is met. The Administration has therefore
described the Order as establishing a new "decision mechanism" that
will help ensure efficiency-based regulations whenever its substantive
requirements are consistent with the relevant enabling statute. 3 6 When
an enabling statute requires agencies to balance costs and benefits of a
rule, the Order simply implements what the statute independently requires 37 But when a statute neither prohibits nor requires considera33. Id § 4, 3 C.F.R. 130 (1982).
34. Sec. 2 GeneraReqdremnts. In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing

regulations, and develop

legislative proposals concerning regulation, all agencies, to

the extent permitted by law, shall adhere to the following requirements:
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning the
need for and consequences of proposed government action;

(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for
[sic) the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society,
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society,

(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggregate net

benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the particular industries affected

by regulations, the condition of the national economy, and other regulatory actions con-

templated for the future.
Id § Z 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982).
35. Id § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982).

36. DeregulationIJ'Q: An Interview on the New Executive Order with MurrayL Weldebaum
and James C Miller III, Ro., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 15 [hereinafter cited as DeregubaonHQI.
37. The Supreme Court identified a number of statutes that expressly require cost-benefit
analysis in American Textile Mfrs. Inst, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510-11 n.30 (1981). The
Court also noted that in other statutes Congress has used the phrase "unreasonable" to signify that
agencies were to use a cost-benefit analysis in rulemaking . Id (citing Consumer Product Safety
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tion of cost, or lists cost consideration simply as one of several factors
that the agency must consider in its rulemaking, the Order makes that
factor first among equals; because regulatory action cannot be undertaken if costs outweigh benefits, cost is essentially the determinative
factor.38 For this reason, the Order can operate to displace or to control agency discretion in particular rulemaking decisions, 39 notwithstanding its express disavowal of any intent to do so. 40
Finally, the Reagan Order's managerial provisions contemplate a
stronger enforcement role for the OMB than the executive has assumed

under prior orders. The Order does not define costs and benefits, thus
seeming to leave a measure of discretion to the agencies in satisfying its

substantive requirements. The OMB is authorized, however, to prepare standards for the identification of major rules or to designate major rules itself, to prepare standards for the development of RIAs, to

waive the Order's requirements for particular rules, and to exempt entire categories of rules from the Order.4' More significantly, the Order
requires the agencies to submit to the OMB preliminary RIAs for review prior to the publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking and to

submit final RIAs for review prior to the publication of final rules. 42
Judicial and statutory rulemaking deadlines permitting, an agency
must both refrain from publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking until the OMB concludes its review of the RIA and refrain from publishing its final rule until it has responded to the OMB views. 43 These

provisions enable the OMB not only. to delay the regulatory process,
Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(1976)); see also Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and Aiss: Oversight of
Health andEnvironmentalDecisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL L. Rnv. 191, 210-14 (1980).
38. Compare S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 54 (1981) (analyzing effect of similar costbenefit and cost-effectiveness requirements in proposed legislation) with Sunstein, Cost.Benefit
Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 ARiZ. L. RE v. 1267, 1280 (1981) (arguing that Orders
requirements only apply to rulemaking under efficiency-promoting statutes).
39. See Center for Science in the Public Interest v. Department of Treasury, 56 AD. L. REP.
20 (P&F) 159, 168-70 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1983) (rule rescission based on Reagan Order's cost/benefit
test violates agency's statutory discretion).
40. Reagan Order, § 2, 3(f)(3), 3 C.F.R. 128, 130 (1982). But see Shane, supra note 25, at
1240.
41. Reagan Order, § 3(b), 6,3 C.F.R. 128, 131 (1982). OMB has issued "Interim Regulatory
Impact Analysis Guidance" (June 13, 1981), reprimedhi 12 EN'vT REP. (BNA) 258-59 (June 19,
1981), to the agencies, elaborating rather generally on RIA requirements, but has to date left the
development of detailed definitions and measurement techniques to the agencies themselves.
Some agencies have issued internal implementing rules or guides. See, e.g., U.S. DE'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF INDUSTRY PoLicy, GUIDANCE FOR REOULATORY EVALUATIONS

(Apr. 15, 1982) (copy on file with author).
42. Reagan Order, § 3(cX2), 3 C.F.R. 129 (1982).
43. Id. § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 129-30 (1982).

Vol. 1983.285]

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,291

but, as a practical matter, to halt the process altogether simply by withholding comment indefinitely" as a kind of regulatory "pocket veto."
The Reagan Order's decision mechanism could thus affect a major
rule in several ways. The preparation of a preliminary RIA and even
the anticipation of OMB review could make an agency alter or abandon a proposed rule before it ever leaves the agency for the 0MB or for
public comment. 45 Administration spokesmen have already attributed
this preemptive effect to the Order.46 In addition, an RIA may cause
an agency to substantially modify a proposed or final regulation to
meet the substantive requirements of the Order or, failing that, to withdraw or rescind the regulation. 47 The Order also authorizes the suspension of existing regulations for reconsideration under its substantive
provisions. 48
44. Comment, svpra note 23, at 642-43 n.175.
45. Of course, agencies may also anticipate OMB review by rejecting certain alternatives
before the proposed rule is published, or by preparing overly stringent rules to leave themselves
leeway to modify in the direction suggested by OMB. See COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILrrY, ExEcUmVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS
OF THE COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, 1974-80, at 35 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
COWPS REviEw]; De Muth, ContraidgRegzdatory Cotrs Part , The /U'teHouseReview Programs, REG, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 21.
46. "It was the first year in several decades that the federal dog did not bark." Kosters and

Eisenach, Is Regulory Relt'fEnough?, REo. Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 20, 22 (quoting then-Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers, M. Weidenbaum). Critics of the review process have conceded this impact, but view it as "undermining public participation." ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE,
supra note 23, at 31.
47. See, eg., NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS FOR RESCISSION OF AUToMATIC OCCUPANT PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS (Oct. 1981)
(concluding that the substantive requirements of the Reagan Order were not satisfied by automatic seat belt rules, later rescinded, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981)) (the United States Supreme
Court recently held that the NHTSA's recission of the passive restraint was arbitrary and capricious, see DOT v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 4953 (U.S. June 21, 1983)); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, REGULATORY IMPACT AND REGULATORY
FLEXIBIIrTY ANALYSIS FOR THE HEARING CONSERVATION AMENDMENT (1981) (analyzing alter-

natives to original rule and identifying as most cost-effective a substantially diluted alternative,
later promulgated as a find rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,622 (1981)); see aso ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE,
.urq
note 23, at 60-63.
48. Reagan Order, § 7(d), 3 C.F.R. 132 (1982). On taking office, President Reagan directed
the postponement of 172 "midnight" regulations of the outgoing administration to permit their
"xeconsideration" under the Reagan Order. Of these, 12 were substantially changed, 18 withdrawn or suspended, and 30 were still undergoing review as of April 1982. OMB, EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12,291 ON FEDERAL REGULATION: PROGRESS DURING 1981 at 33 (Apr. 23, 1982); see,
tg, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,936 (1981) (suspending industrial wastewater pretreatment standards "until
further notice ... pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,291."). The EPA candidly admitted that
suspension of this standard deprives the public of its benefits during the duration of the suspension. 47 Fed. Reg. 4519-20 (1982). Environmentalists successfully challenged this suspension on
the ground that the agency failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the APA, 5
U.S.C. §,553 (1976), before suspending the final rule. See Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982); see ahs Center for Science in the Public Interest v.
Department of Treasury, 56 AD. L. REP. 2D (P&F) 159 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1983) (vacating rescission
of regulation that had failed Reagan Order cost/benefit test).
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In short, where a regulatory enabling statute does not prohibit the
use of efficiency-based criteria in the regulatory process, the Reagan
Order can substantially alter a regulation and the burden that it places
on the regulated. This gives both proponents and opponents of regulation an intense interest in the enforcement of the Order and, in particular, in the adequacy of the RIAs prepared in connection with major
49
rules.
III. THE MEUTS: IS THE REAGAN ORDER BINDING?
A constitutional law enacted by Congress binds agencies and private persons alike as an exercise of the legislative authority expressly
conferred on Congress by the Constitution.50 Where Congress has
properly delegated legislative authority to an administrative agency,
any rules promulgated by the agency in accordance with applicable
procedure have the "force and effect of law." 51 Such "legislative" rules
are binding on agencies and private parties as if the rules were statutes.52 In contrast, "non-legislative" rules and agency pronouncements, 53 because they lack delegated legislative authority, do not have
the force and effect of law.54 Such rules and pronouncements can nevertheless bind agencies under the constitutional or administrative due
process doctrine that agencies must follow their own rules when they
are not merely internal rules of procedure that guide the agency in its
day-to-day affairs.55
49. Of course, these interests are not identical Because the costs of regulation are easier to
identify and to measure than the benefits, see, eg., Costle, EnviromnentalRegulation andRegulatory Re.form, 57 WASH. L. REV. 409, 419 (1982), and because "forcing an official to acknowledge
publicly the existence and extent of some negative consequence of the policy makes it easier for
those who oppose the policy to mobilize their opposition," De Muth, supra note 45, at 17-18,
proponents of regulation generally disfavor and opponents generally favor judicial review of
agency compliance with the Reagan Order.
50. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
51. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-96, 301-03 (1979); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683,694-96 (1974). Seegenerally2 K DAVIs, AD ISNtsrTIvE LAW TREATISE § 7.21 (2d
ed. 1979).
52. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-96, 301-03 (1979); Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison Ry., 284 U.S. 370,386 (1932); see 3 B. MaznqEs, J. STUN & J. GauFF, ADMNIsTRATrVE
LAw § 13.03[1], at 37-38 (1981); Berger, Do RegulationsRealy BindRegulators?62 Nw. U.L. Rv.
137 (1967); Note, iolationsby.4gencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARv. L. RLy. 629, 630 n.8
(1974).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1976) exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization procedure, or practice" from the usual rulemaking procedures of
Section 553.
54. 2 K. DAvis, supra note 51, § 7.21, at 100.
55. Accord United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754 (1979); see 2 K. DAVIs, Supra note 51,
§ 7.21; 3 B. MilEz s, J. STm, & L GRuFf, supranote 52, § 13.03[21; B. ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATvE LAW § 58, at 153 (1976) ("procedure rules are legally binding; they are given statutory effect,
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An executive order fits somewhat uncomfortably into this framea
work. An order carries the force and effect of law when it is based on 56
President.
the
to
Congress
from
specific grant of legislative authority
But an executive order that is not based on a specific statutory grant
may derive the force and effect of law from the President's independent
constitutional authority, standing alone, or in conjunction with congressional acquiescence in long-standing executive practice. 57 Alternatively, if the President's managerial orders can be considered rules of
the agencies to which they apply,58 then, though they lack the force and
effect of law, they may still bind agencies under the doctrine that agencies are bound by their own rules.59 The following section shows that
though it is doubtful that the Reagan Order derives the force and effect
of law from independent executive authority, the Order is a rule that
agencies must follow as a matter of administrative due process.
A.

Obeying the Law: The Order as Law.

1. Force andEffect from Statute. In issuing an executive order
pursuant to a statutory grant of authority, the President exercises legislative authority delegated to him by Congress. The order is therefore
the legal equivalent of a statute. 60 Judicial enforcement of such an order does not raise questions of separation of powers because the courts
are enforcing the legislature's policy as implemented by its delegate.
In issuing the Reagan Order, the President cited no specific statutory authority, but instead relied simply on "the authority vested in me
as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of
America. ' 61 In finding the Order "acceptable as to form and legality,"
the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice (OLC) similarly identified no specific statutory grant of authority for the Order. 62
It does not follow, however, that the Order is not binding on the agencies. The Supreme Court has emphasized that a specific statutory grant
even though they may be nonstatutory, Le., not promulgated pursuant to an express statutory
delegation"). Id at 159-60.
56. See ofra text accompanying notes 60-64.
57. See infiu text accompanying notes 82-138.
58. See infm text accompanying notes 146-54.
59. See hifra text accompanying notes 154-83.
60. See, eg., Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir.), cert.denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967); Brookhaven Hos. Coalition v. Kunzig, 341 F. Supp. 1026,1030 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
61. Reagan Order, Preamble, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
62. OLC MEoMRANDUM ara note 21, at 1. By regulation of the Justice Department, proposed executive orders are sent to the Attorney General "for his consideration as to both form and
legality." I C.F.R. § 19.2(b) (1982). According to a former staff member of the OLC, disapproval
usually aborts promulgation of the order in disapproved form. See Brufl .mpra note 10, at 15
n.55.
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of legislative authority to the executive is not required in order for regulations promulgated pursuant to that grant to carry the force and effect of law.63 It is enough that the statutory grant of authority
reasonably contemplates the regulations issued."
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,65 OMB enabling legisla66
tion, and periodic statutory grants of reorganizational authority to the
President 67 centralize agency coordinating and clearance functions in
the Office of the President and are therefore possible sources of implied
legislative authority for the Order. 68 None of these statutes, however,
has the required nexus to the Reagan Order. They are concerned with
government paper flow, procedures for information collection, budgetary process, and the organization of the executive branch, not with the
policies that the Order implements. At best, these statutes provide support for the reporting and perhaps some of the managerial provisions
of the Order, but they cannot reasonably be construed as contemplating
either the full extent of managerial control asserted by the Order or its
substantive cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness requirements.
Moreover, any authority that the President takes from these statutes is subject to the limitations they impose. These statutes limit that
authority well short of the Reagan Order's substantive provisions. The
Paperwork Reduction Act, for example, expressly disavows any intent
to increase "the authority of the President, the Office of Management
63. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979).
64. Id
65. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980), (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.; 20
U.S.C.; 30 U.S.C.; 42 U.S.C., and 44 U.S.C.). The Act gives the Director of the OMB limited
review and clearance authority over agency information collection requests in order to reduce
paperwork burdens on the public. The OLC has cited the Act as "some implied statutory support" for the reporting and managerial provisions of the Order. OLC MEMORANDUM supra note
21, at 7 n.8. But see OFFICE OF LEGAL COuNsEL, U.S. D.P'T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM RE:
PAPERWORK REDUCION ACT OF 1980 (June 22, 1982) (concluding, contrary to OMB argument,
that OMB's power under the Act to review paperwork regulations is much narrower than its
power over paperwork forms), discussedin Moore, DOJ Restricts OMB's Paper Revlew Power,
Legal Times of Washington, June 28,1982, at 1, col 4.; Moore, New Justice Opinion Okays OMB
Proposalon Papenvork R"der, Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (reporting
partial Justice Department "retreat" from June 22, 1982 position regarding OMB power to review

paperwork regulations).
66. OMB was created by Rorg. Plan No. 2 of 1970,3 C.F.R. 1070 (1966-70 Comp.), reprinted
in 31 U.S.C. § 16 app. at 1197 (1976) and in 84 Stat. 2085 (1970), as a successor to the Bureau of
the Budget. The Bureau was created by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 6713, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.), which first centralized agency
budgetary activity in the Office of the President. See Rosenberg supra note 23, at 221-25.
67. See 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto andthe Constilt'on
- A Re-examination, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 351, 355-57 (1978).
68. Seegenerally Bru, supra note 21, at 489-94; Verkuil, JawboningAdmbstratveAgenles,:
ExPareContactsbythe White Howe 80 COLUM L. REv. 943, 963-64 (1980).
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and Budget or the director thereof... with respect to the substantive
policies and programs of departments, agencies and officers." 6 9 Congress has carefully and deliberately limited OMB enabling legislation
in adverse reaction to executive overreaching during the Nixon Administration.70 The President may not use reorganizational authority to
abolish designated statutory programs. Moreover, Congress has traditionally withheld such authority by legislative veto.7 1 Thus these are
narrow statutory grants of authority to the President that do not support an inference of legislative authority that could vest the Reagan
Order with the force and effect of law.
Congress has granted "the head of an Executive department" the
authority to prescribe regulations for control of agency conduct, practice, and procedure. 72 If the President is considered the head of a department within the statute, 73 this authority, on its face, might support
the reporting and perhaps the managerial provisions of the Reagan Order.74 The Supreme Court, however, has characterized this provision
as a mere "housekeeping statute" that is "simply a grant of authority to
the agency to regulate its own affairs," and not a grant of legislative
authority to issue regulations with the force of law.75 Thus, this provi69. 44 U.S.C. § 3518(e) (1976).
70. See, eg., Budget Impoundment Control Act, Pub. L No. 93-250, 88 Stat. 11 (codified at
31 U.S.C. § 61 (1976); 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (1976)) (requiring some agency budget requests to bypass OMB or to go concurrently to congressional budget office). See generally L. TRIBE, AMEIsCAN CONyiTrUTIONAL LAW 196-98 (1978).

71. See ampra note 67. The latest reorganizational authority, Reorganization Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-17,91 Stat. 32 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. IV 1980)), lapsed on April 6, 1981.
Legislation to extend the Act passed the Senate, but is still pending in the House. See S. 893, 97th
Cong., 1st. Sess, 127 CONG. REC. S6169 (daily ed. June 15, 1981). The Supreme Court recently
held the legislative veto unconstitutional, see Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 51
U.S.L.W. 4907 (U.S. June 21, 1983), but this fact does not affect congressional intent to withhold
authority in delegating statutes. Congress will likely seek alternative methods of limiting
authority.
72. "The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations
for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performane ofits business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property." 5
U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
73. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) with 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976), which expressly names the
President in granting authority to prescribe regulations for the conduct of employees in the executive branch.
74. See Gonzalez v. Chasen, 506 F. Supp. 990, 992 (D.P.R. 1980) (administrative regulation
promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301 treated as "law" for purpose of establishing federal questionjurisdiction). BSW ee Einhorn v. DeWitt, 618 F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1980) (procedural rules
promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301 do not have force and effect of law); Chasse v. Chasen,
595 F.2d 59, 63 (st Cir. 1979) (general grant of authority under 5 U.S.C. § 301 too broad to serve
as statutory authority for legislative rulemaking).
75. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309-10 (1979). The statute authorizes those nonlegislative regulations that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) terms "rules of agency, or-
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sion is not a delegation of legislative authority for any provision of the
Reagan Order.
A final possible source of implied statutory authority for the Order
may be regulatory enabling statutes themselves. Insofar as the Order is
intended to direct implementation of regulatory legislation by cost-beneficial and cost-efficient rulemaking, it might be viewed as a reasonable
and necessary exercise of the legislative authority specifically delegated
by the various regulatory statutes that authorize the rulemaking. But
Congress delegates this legislative authority to the agencies, not to the
President, and the Order does not cite or purport to exercise any
rulemaking authority delegated by specific statutes. Nor was the Order
promulgated with the rulemaking procedures required by these statutes
or by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).76 Moreover, even if
the Order were arguably necessary to carry out those regulatory statutes that expressly embody efficiency criteria, 77 it still has no necessary
nexus to and is not reasonably contemplated by statutes that fail to
mention cost or efficiency or to78 make cost or efficiency determinative in
agency rulemaking decisions.
The foregoing is not intended to argue that the Reagan Order is
"in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations" for purposes of the APA,' 9 or otherwise unlawful. Indeed, this article assumes
the opposite for purposes of analysis, 0 and the statutes discussed above
may furnish some legal authority for the Order. But to assume or to
conclude that the Order is lawful is not to say that it is judicially cogniganization, procedure or practice," as opposed to legislative regulations which the APA terms
"substantive." Id at 310 (quoting from 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(2)(A) & (d)(l) (1976)).

76. The rulemaking provisions of the APA have generally been thought to be inapplicable to
actions of the President. See, eg., Metzenbaum v. Edwards, 510 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D.D.C. 1981);
cf.Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (Office of

President is not an "agency" for purpose of the Freedom of Information Act). But see 5 U.S.C.

§§ 551(1), 701(b)(1) (1976) (excluding Congress and the courts, but not the President, from definition of "agencies"). Unlike the heads of the regulatory agencies and departments, the President is
directly accountable to the public at the polls. As their elected representative, he is considered
more sensitive than non-elected agency personnel to the public's views. The President is therefore
less in need of the checks that are afforded by the APA's requirements for public participation in
rulemaking.
Nevertheless, President Carter solicited public comments on a draft of the Carter Order,
swpra note 27, predecessor to the Reagan Order. See 42 Fed. Reg. 59,740 (1977). No such notice
and comment was employed for the Reagan Order, though the Order was published in the Federal
Register pursuant to the procedural requirements for the preparation and promulgation of orders
and proclamations established by a prior executive order. Exec. Order No. 11,030, 3 C.F.R. 610
(1959-63 Comp.), reprintedin 44 U.S.C. § 1505 app. at 11081-82 (1976).
77. See upra note 37.
78. Rodgers, sura note 37, at 201-04 (describing "cost-oblivious" legislative formula).

79. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2Xc) (1976).
80. See mpra note 23.
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zable law."' None of the possible implied statutory grants of authority
for the Order reasonably contemplates its provisions so as to give it the
force and effect of law.
2. Force andEffect from the "WIlight Zone". When there is no
specific grant of statutory authority for an executive order, many courts
will conclude that the order lacks the force and effect of law. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that an executive order issued without specific statutory authority is a purely
executive "project" that lacks the effect of law. 2 Similarly, in an action
to review agency compliance with the Ford Order, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that only a specific statutory delegation, and not the Constitution standing alone, can give an executive
83
order the force and effect of law.
These decisions reflect the rigid view of the separation of powers
articulated by Justice Black in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
(the Steel Seizure Case)." Relying on asserted "inherent power"8 5 as
Commander-in-Chief, President Truman had issued an executive order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel plants to avoid a
nationwide strike during an asserted wartime emergency. In an opinion for the Court that affirmed an injunction against the seizure, Justice
Black squarely rejected President Truman's claim of independent executive lawmaking authority and adhered to the view that the Constitution rigidly compartmentalizes executive and legislative powers.8 6
81. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 n.40, 320-21 (Marshall, 3., concurring).
In Ckyrler, the Court held that an agency regulation issued pursuant to a managerial executive
order was not "law" for the purposes of applying the Trade Secrets Act. But the Court expressly
reserved the distinct question of whether the lack of specific statutory authority invalidated either
the regulation or the executive order.
82. Stevens v. Carey, 483 F.2d 188, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Wyate,
549 F. Supp. 1376, 1387-89 (CD. Cal. 1982); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp.
457, 502, (D. Kan. 1978), a7d, 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
83. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 288, 235 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 966 (1976).
84. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
85. Although there appears to be no uniform usage, executive powers under the Constitution
can be classified as express, implied, and inherent, the latter loosely referring to vague powers that
"inhere from the nature of the governmental organ." A. Mnjym, PRESDNTIAL PowER 31, 87
(1977); see also Winterton, Te Concept of Ex ra-ConstitutionalExecutive Power in Domestic Affair, 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1, 9-13 (1979). In the SteelSeizure Case, the government asserted
that the President had "inherent power" to seize the steel mills, but then rested its argument in
part on the President's implied authority as "Commander-In-Chief" under article I, section 2 of
the Constitution. Given the fuzziness of these distinctions, unless otherwise noted, this article uses
the term "independent executive authority" to embrace all three classifications of executive power.
86. In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits
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Under this view of presidential authority, an executive order can have
the force and effect of law only if it is issued pursuant to a delegation of
legislative authority from Congress because Congress alone is constitu-

tionally empowered to make laws.8 7 The concurring Justices in the
Steel Seizure Case, however, did not all share Justice Black's rigid view
of the separation of powers. Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, and
Clark found it determinative that Congress had expressly withheld the
plant seizure authority from the President and had established alternative procedures that the President had disregarded. 88 Including the dissenters, 89 seven members of the Court were thus prepared to endorse a
limited executive lawmaking authority in the absence of contrary congressional action, at least in undefined circumstances of emergency.90
Justice Jackson's analysis has been the most enduring. He concluded that "[piresidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."9 1
He identified three degrees of presidential power: (1) power at its maximum, when it is exercised pursuant to an express or implied statutory
authorization by Congress; (2) power in a "zone of twilight" of concurrent executive and congressional authority, when exercised absent
either a congressional grant or denial of authority; and (3) power "at its
lowest ebb," when it is exercised in the face of contrary legislative action.92 In the "twilight zone" of concurrent power, "congressional inerhis functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of law he thinks wise and
the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal
about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.
343 U.S. at 587. Justice Douglas, concurring, also emphatically concluded that "the power to
execute the laws starts and ends with the laws Congress has enacted." Id at 633.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
88. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 602-04 (Frankfurter, J.,concurring), 639 (Jackson, J.,
concurring), 659-60 (Burton, J.,
concurring), 662 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
89. The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justices Reed and Minton,
quoted with approval the proposition that independent executive authority "does not mean an
authority to disregard the wishes of Congress on the subject.. . when those wishes have been
expressed," id at 691, but concluded that Congress had not expressed any intent to withhold
seizure authority from the executive. Id at 702-03.
90. Since the Court agreed that the plant seizure could not be justified as an exercise of the
President's powers as Commander-In-Chief, the source of this limited executive lawmaking authority was either section 3 of article H, which directs the President to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed," or some aggregate of all the express and implied powers of the President. See
Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A JudiialBrick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L.REv.53, 65 (1953);
Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case. Congres, The President and the Supreme Court, 51 MicH. L.
REv.141, 175-76 (1952).
91. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, 3., concurring).
92. 1d at 635-38. Professor John Fairlie appears to have coined the phrase "twilight zone."
inhere is a broad twilight zone between the field of what is distinctly and exclusively
legislative and what is necessarily executive in character,. . . courts have recognized
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tia, indifference, or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility."93 At other times, when Congress has not had the opportunity to respond in any fashion,94 no such invitation can be found, and
the President must rely solely on an assertion of independent executive
authority in a congressional void.
Because statutes neither specifically authorize nor prohibit the
Reagan Order,95 this analysis suggests that the executive authority that
the Order asserts must be found in the "twilight zone" of concurrent
authority. In that zone, (a) congressional acquiescence in an established executive practice or (b) independent executive authority standing alone may vest an executive order with the force and effect of law.
Provided that the threshold requirements for suit are satisfied, judicial
enforcement of such law is appropriate, "and indeed the United States
as the sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect
and to enforce it."96

a. CongressionalAcquiescence. In the search for congressional
acquiescence, "the court considers both the implications of statutes that
do not actually authorize the action in question and the President's
constitutional power, without relying on either exclusively." 97 The
that matters within this "no man's land" may be at times included in statutory legislation, and at other times may be expressly authorized by statute for administrative action;
and if neither of these steps is taken such action has been, under some circumstances,
assumed as an inherent executive or administrative power.
Fairlie,.Adn&&trativeLegiiation, 18 MICH. L. REv.181, 189 (1920).
93. Steel Seiure Case, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); accord United States v.
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (congressional acquiescence in longstanding executive managerial practice of withdrawing public lands from private use creates presumption of congressional consent). See Note, di'cial Review of Exective Action, supra note 10, at 1539-42.
94. q.TRtmE, s=pra note 70, at 182 (describing executive power "which, because of the inevitably situational character of executive activity, could not realistically have been anticipated or
enumerated in advance").
95. Although some statutes preclude the use of a cost-benefit criterion in rulemaking, see,
ag., American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (construing portions of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act), the Order only applies "to the extent permitted by law."
Reagan Order § 2, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982). Congress has also recently exempted rulemaking under
the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 from the Reagan Order. Amendment to Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 97-58, 1981 Stat. 979 (1981) (to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
96. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974) (rejecting separation of powers argument that executive branch compliance with a Department of Justice regulation is an "intrabranch" matter not subject to judicial enforcement). Although the regulation in Nixon was
promulgated pursuant to statutory authority, arguably making the issue one of executive compliance with legislative policy, the Court's opinion turned on the regulation's status as law.
97. Brufl =wu note 10, at 33. The acquiescence theory of executive power "enables courts
.oavoid rendering direct definitions of the President's 'inherent' or implied powers when it is not
necessary to do so." Id at 35.
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Supreme Court recently employed this analysis in Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 98 the case upholding the executive agreement and various executive orders involved in the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis. After refusing to find express or implied statutory authority for the
President's suspension of domestic claims against Iranian assets and referral of such claims to an international tribunal, the Court noted that
Congress had enacted legislation "closely related to the question of the
President's authority" in the hostage matter that could be considered to
"'invite measures on independent presidential responsibility.' "99 The
Court referred to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
and the Hostage Act. These statutes did not confer the requisite power
on the President either expressly or by implication. They were, however, closely related to the President's independent constitutional responsibilities in the areas of foreign policy and national security and
were therefore "relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional
acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such
as those presented."' 0
The Court also noted that congressional inaction in the face of a
180-year executive practice, well-known to Congress, of settling claims
by executive agreement, supported an inference of executive authority
in the twilight zone of concurrent executive and congressional authority. 10 1 Thus, the Court upheld the President's actions against a due
process attack and effectively ruled that those actions had the force and
effect of law insofar as they operated to suspend and transfer pending
claims against the Iranian assets.
A court applying this theory of executive power to the Reagan Order would look to the same agency-coordinating and oversight statutes
noted above,10 2 in light of the President's independent constitutional
responsibilities to supervise executive personnel and to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed."10 3 The Paperwork Reduction Act, reorganization statutes, and budgetary legislation creating the OMB do
not reasonably contemplate the substantive requirements of the Reagan Order. They are, however, closely related to the supervisory responsibilities of the President and accord him a prominent role in the
legislative schemes that they create.
98. 453 U.S. 654 (1981); see Bruff; supra note 10, at 33-36.
99. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,678 (1981) (quoting SteelSelzure Case, 343 U.S.
at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).

100. 453 U.S. at 677.
101. Id at 679-82.
102. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
103. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3.

VOL 1983".285]

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,291

Yet, if these statutes could be considered to "invite" action on independent presidential responsibility, it is a carefully closed-ended and
grudging invitation, given the express limitations on executive power
noted aboveY°4 It is hard, for example, to read the Paperwork Reduction Act's disavowal of any intent to increase the President's authority
over the administrative agencies as an invitation to independent presidential action imposing substantive requirements on agency
rulemaking.10 5
Moreover, in Dames & Moore, the Court upheld presidential action in foreign affairs, a field that Congress traditionally has not closely
controlled, but instead has left largely to the President. In contrast,
Congress has exercised varying degrees of control over administrative
rulemaking by specifying the factors that an agency must consider,
describing the procedures that an agency must follow, and subjecting
many regulations to legislative veto.1 6 Similarly, even in agency-coordinating legislation such as the Paperwork Reduction Act, Congress
has legislated carefully and in detail with respect to the powers of the
executive. 0 7 In areas where Congress has traditionally exercised close
control, the absence of explicit authority for particular presidential action carries a negative implication for executive authority. 0 8
Nor is congressional acquiescence suggested by other congressional action or inaction in response to a known and established executive practice. The predicate for congressional acquiescence is an
unbroken executive practice of sufficient duration, consistency, and visibility for Congress to know of the practice."' 9 The first executive requirement for regulatory analysis of major rules dates back only seven
years, however, to the Ford Order (although the Nixon Administration
briefly required analysis of environmental regulations).110 Seven years
compares neither with the 180-year executive practice involved in the
104. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
105. See 44 U.S.C. § 3518(e) (Supp. IV 1980). But see Shane, supra note 25, at 1260 ("there
exists no justification for treating broad, unstated policy concerns, at most implicit in the enactments of Congress, as binding expressions of legislative will limiting the President's powers of
administrative supervision.").
106. See, eg., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976); Bruff& Gellhorn, CongressonalControlofAdministrative
Regulaiox A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv.L REv. 1369 (1977).
107. Compare 44 U.S.C. §§ 3504(h), 3507 (Supp. IV 1980) (specifying, intera/ia, OMB review
schedule for information collection requests in connection with agency rulemaking) with Reagan
Order § 3, 3 C.F.R. 128-30 (1982) (OMB review schedule for major rules and RIAs).
108. Brut supra note 10, at 36; Note, JudicialReview of Executive Action, supra note 10, at
1541.
concurring); see aso Haig v. Agee,
109. SteelSeiwre Case, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J.,
453 U.S. 280 (1981).
110. See supra note 27.
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Dames & Moore case, nor with the thirty year executive practice of
prohibiting discrimination by federal contractors that was upheld on an
acquiescence theory by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit."'

l

Furthermore, the practice of requiring regulatory analysis has not been
consistent. The mandatory efficiency criteria in the Reagan Order are a
sharp break with the hortatory" 2 guidelines of the Ford and Carter
Orders.
It is also difficult to construe the congressional reaction to the Reagan Order and its predecessors as approval of the executive practice,
however well-known the practice may be. In 1981, the Senate unanimously approved S.1080, a bill that would require agencies, subject to
executive oversight, to determine in a regulatory analysis that the benefits of a major rule 'justify" its cost and that the rule is the most costeffective of all alternatives.11 3 Although the committee report accompanying S.1080 favorably cites the Reagan Order, the bill's 'justification" test is an apparently intentional relaxation of the cost-benefit
requirement of the Order."1 4 The companion bill in the House, H.R.
746, is still pending as of this writing. H.R. 746 relaxes the cost-benefit
requirements even further to mandate only "an explanation of how the
benefits of the rule bear a reasonable relationship to the costs and other
adverse effects of the rule."' 15 This relaxation is arguably a return to
the general guidelines of the Ford and Carter Orders. The bill is held
up in the House partly because of disagreement about its substantive
analytic requirements and the role of executive oversight.1 16 Congress
therefore has implicitly approved neither the exacting substantive requirements that are the heart of the Reagan Order nor its managerial
provisions. Accordingly, neither executive practice nor recent congressional interest in regulatory reform legislation paralleling the Reagan
111. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 168-71 (3d Cir.) (tracing history of
use of executive orders for this purpose in upholding the legality of Executive Order No. 11,246 on
an "acquiescence" theory), c=t denid, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
112. The Administration has emphasized this point. See upra note 36; Rosenberg, supra note
23, at 218 (Reagan Order "stands alone").
113. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 622(d)(2), 624, 127 CONo.REc. S14,132 (daily ed. Nov.
30, 1981).
114. S.REP. No. 305, supra note 38, at 43-53.
115. H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 622(cX5) (1982). The report on the bill by the House
Committee on the Judiciary expressly emphasizes that "this requirement in no way creates a new
substantive standard on agency rulemaking (i.e., that benefits exceed costs)." H.R. REP. No. 435,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1982). The House bill also provides that the OMB Director shall only

have the authority to "monitor and review" implementation. The bill conspicuously omits the
power granted in S. 1080 to "ensure" implementation. Compare H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
1
§ 628(aX ) (1982) with S. 1080, 97th Cong., IstSess. § 624(a) (1982).
116. Masters, R#form Bill ProponentsStil Can't4greeon Wording, Legal Times of Washington, Sept. 20, 1982. at 4, coL L
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Order constitutes congressional acquiescence that is sufficient to give
the Order the force and effect of law. 117 Even if such congressional
action is deemed sufficient to authorize the Order, it falls short of the
showing needed to make the Order law.118
b. IndependentExecutive Authority StandingAlone. If there is no
discernible congressional acquiescence in an executive order, a reviewing court must directly confront the question whether the President has
independent executive lawmaking authority. The Supreme Court's decision in In re Neaglet1 9 illustrates this alternative theory of executive
authority in the twilight zone of shared authority. Neagle was a Deputy United States Marshal assigned by the Attorney General to protect
Supreme Court Justice Field. When he shot and killed an assailant in
the course of this assignment, state authorities arrested Neagle and
charged him with murder. Neagle then sought a writ of habeas corpus
under a federal statute extending the writ to federal officers in custody
for "act[s] done in pursuance of a law of the United States."120 The
issue on appeal of a grant of the writ was thus whether an executive
directive, issued through the Attorney General, is a "law of the United
States," or phrased differently, whether such an executive directive carries the force and effect of law.
Noting the President's authority and obligation under the Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," the Court
concluded that such laws are not limited to those enacted by Congress,
but include rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself 121 The Court thus implied that the President had independent executive authority, stemming from his duty to take care that
government officials are protected in the execution of their duties, to
appoint the marshal. The Court then ruled that the appointment was
"law" within the meaning of the statute. 1 2 Five years after Neagle, in
117. Brufi; ara note 10, at 36 ("where executive practice lacks either consistency or visibility,
or where congressional reaction to it is ambiguous, courts should not find acquiescence in the
practice).
118. See supra notes 60-81 and accompanying text.
119. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
120. Id at 40 (quoting § 753 of the Revised Statutes).
121. 1d at 63-67; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) (independent executive authority to remove certain executive officers). The Mr majority gave an expansive reading to the President's constitutional powers: "The executive power was given in general terms,
strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by
direct expressions where limitation was needed .... " Id at 118.
122. In the view we take of the Constitution of the United States, any obligation fairly
and properly inferrable from that instrument, or any duty of the marshal to be derived
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In re Debs,12 3 the Supreme Court again upheld a claim of independent
executive authority in the domestic sphere. In Debs, the Court affirmed
the issuance of a labor injunction against the Pullman Strike of 1895.
The President had sought the injunction without statutory authority.
Neagle and Debs, however, both involved emergencies---the immediate need to protect Justice Field's life as he rode the circuits and
the need to keep the nation's railroads and mail moving. These emergencies arguably justified by-passing the existing legislative process for
obtaining the requisite authority. Moreover, the Steel Seizure Case
subsequently taught that an emergency is not in itself sufficient justification for executive action when Congress has disapproved or withheld
the asserted executive authority. What emerges from this sparse and
hoary case law is that absent congressional acquiescence there is a very
narrow, if not nonexistent, 24 independent executive lawmaking authority: it exists only when justified by emergency and then only when
Congress has not signaled its disapproval.
It is against this background that the OLC approved the legality of
the Reagan Order as an exercise of the President's authority under the
Constitution. 25 Citing the 'Take Care" provision of the Constitution,
the OLC argues that the President has the distinct constitutional function of coordinating the simultaneous execution of many statutes and
that he is "uniquely situated to design and execute a uniform method
for undertaking regulatory initiatives."1 26 The Order establishes such a
method in the exercise of the President's supervisory function and aufrom the general scope of his duties under the laws of the United States, is 'a law' within
the meaning of this phrase.
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 59. The dissenters countered with the rhetorical question,
if he [Neagle] claims the authority of law, then what law? And if a law, how came it to
be a law? Somehow and somewhere it must have had an origin. Is it a law because of
the existence of a special and private authority issued from one of the executive departments?
Id at 89 (Lamar, J. dissenting); 5( Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 156 (1871)
(Presidential pardon is "a public act of which all courts of the United States are bound to take
notice, and to which all courts are bound to give effect.").
123. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
124. Professor Tribe describes Debt "as more anachronism than authority," which "received a
serious blow" in United States v. United States Dist. Court 407 U.S. 297 (1972), in which the
Court, partly on Fourth Amendment grounds, unanimously rejected the President's claim of independent executive authority to engage in warrantless wiretapping in domestic security cases.
See L. TRmE,supra note 70, at 184; see alto Winterton, supra note 85, at 42; cf. But see Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 1, at 12-13; Levinson, PresidentialSelf-Regulation Through Rulemaking
Comparative Comments on Structuring the ChijExecuive's ConrtitutionalPowers, 9 VAND.J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 695, 712 (1976,; Note, PresidentiaPower: Ue and Enforcement ofExecutive Orders, supra note 1, at 48, 55 (executive orders spring from the President's legislative power and
"possess as much validity and obligation as if they had proceeded from the legislative branch").
125. OLC MEMORANDUM, supra note 21.
126. Id at 2-3.
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thority. The Supreme Court acknowledged this presidential function
in Myers v. United States1 27 when it approved executive authority to
remove executive officers.' 28 The removal authority, reasons the OLC,
presupposes the President's authority to supervise by less drastic
means, such as those adopted by the Reagan Order.
The Steel Seizure Case teaches that Congress may limit the scope
of the authority that it shares with the President. The Administration
anticipated the possibility of such limitations, however, by directing
compliance with the Reagan Order only "to the extent permitted by
law" and by exempting the independent regulatory agencies. 29 In addition, argues the OLC, the Reagan Order does not displace the discretion given to agency heads by regulatory legislation. The agency heads,
and not the President, actually perform the cost-benefit calculations
that the Order requires and "thus retain considerable latitude in determining whether regulatory action is justified and what form such action
should take."' "30 Finally, the Order's reporting and, to some extent,
managerial provisions are independently grounded on an express constitutional grant of authority to the President to "require the Opinion,
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, on any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices."

13 1

At first glance, this analysis suggests an executive claim of independent lawmaking based upon the "Take Care" clause. Such authority would vest the Order with the force and effect of law. But there
is no emergency that occasions the Reagan Order, and as shown above,
Congress has not yet acquiesced in the practice established by the Order, Consequently, the OLC relies on authority which cannot be legislative, and thus the Order cannot be law. The OLC apparently admits
127. 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
128. Id The Court subsequently narrowed that authority to removal of "purely executive
officers". See Humphreys Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
7
129. Reagan Order, §§ l(d), 2, 3(a), 7(e), (g), 8, 3 C.F.R. 128, 131-33 (1982). An earlier draft
of the OLC Memorandum discussed the legal authority for extending the Reagan Order to the
independent regulatory commissions. See Draft OLC MEMoRANDUM, excerpted in DOfIMemo
on JuridictionOverIndependentAgencies, Legal Times of Washington, July 27, 1981, at 24, col 1.
130. OLC MEMoRANDUM, supra note 21, at 6.
131. U.S. CONSr. art. IL § 2, cl. 1; see a~w OLC MEMoRANDUM, supra note 21, at 5. The
court apparently overlooked this direct grant of authority in AMA v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179,
1214 (N.D. L 1977). InAMA the court concluded that the Ford Order (requiring Inflation Impact Statements) lacked the force and effect of law in part because nothing in the statutory author-

ity cited by plaintiffs "expressly or impliedly authorizes the President to require federal agencies to
report to him." See id.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 1983:285

this at the end of its legal opinion, when it concedes that the Order
"lacks the 'force and effect of law' concerning private parties." 132
Instead, the authority that the President asserts for the Reagan Order and that the OLC approves is non-legislative. Such authority does
not require a specific delegation from Congress; even agencies that
have no delegated legislative authority have intrinsic authority to make
rules and to issue statements regarding their own procedures, internal
organization, and housekeeping matters.1 33 Some executive orders also
rest on this uncontroversial' 34 intrinsic authority. An example is an
executive order describing procedures for the processing of commemorative proclamations. 135 Sucn an order is self-evidently directed at internal executive procedure. This authority exists of necessity; rules of
procedure, internal agency organization, and housekeeping are essential if the executive branch is to function. Because this authority is not
legislative, however, the rules and statements made pursuant to it do
not have the force and effect of law.13 6
This analysis of executive authority in part underlies the decision
in Independent Meat Packers Association v. Butz.137 In Independent
Meat Packers, the plaintiffs asserted that a legislative regulation was
invalid because the issuing agency had violated the Ford Order. The
court rejected the argument that the President can independently make
law, but found it unnecessary to explore fully the question of statutory
authority because the Ford Order "was intended primarily as a managerial tool for implementing the President's personal economic poliCies.' u3 The court did not need to undertake an elaborate search for
132. OLC MEMORANDUM, supra note 21, at 12.
133. B. ScHwArTz, supra note 55, at 153 ("with or without an express statutory delegation, all
agencies possess inherent authority to lay down rules governing their own procedures"); see, e.g.,
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694,702 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (agencies without legislative rulemaking
authority may issue non-binding statements governing internal practice or procedure); cf. K. DAvIs, A MnutSTAr]vE LAW TRAriSE § 7.8 at 173 (Supp. 1982) (agency power to issue interpretative rules is "intrinsic" to the power to act).
134. Even commentators who dispute the constitutionality of the Reagan Order concede that
its merely "facilitative" provisions are not objectionable. See Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 212.
Mr. Rosenberg, however, distinguishes procedural directives, which require the agency to change
its decision making process, from facilitative measures, which "create opportunities rather than
impose mandatory procedures." Id at 212 n.85. This distinction is unconvincing; mandatory
procedures can affect the process without exceeding the President's intrinsic non-legislative authority. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 154 (1979) (Carter Order) (mandatory "plain
English" requirement for preliminary and final rules), § 2(c), 3 C.F.R. 153 (1979) (extending public comment period to sixty days).
135. Exec. Order No. 12,080, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1978).
136. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
137. 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976).
138. Id at 236. The Court asserted that the Steel Seizue Case "completely refutes the claim
that the President may act as a lawmaker in the absence of a delegation of authority or mandate
from Congress." Id at 235. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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authority because the President necessarily has non-legislative authority to manage the executive branch by orders that do not have the force
and effect of law.

There are, therefore, ultimately two reasons why the Reagan Order does not bind agencies as "law," even if it is lawful. First, it is
doubtful that the President possesses independent executive authority
to make law, at least absent congressional acquiescence or an emer-

gency justifying temporary executive action until Congress can act.
Second, the Order relies, in any event, not on any such lawmaking authority, but instead on the President's less controversial intrinsic nonlegislative authority to manage and to guide the executive branch.
That the Reagan Order is not "law," however, does not mean that
it has no effect on the agencies. The Order in fact binds the agencies
under the theory that agencies are bound to follow their own rules.
B. Following the Rules: The Order as Rule.

The doctrine that agencies must follow their own rules is a "judicially evolved rule" 139 of uncertain application. 14 The doctrine first
evolved in cases involving legislative rules1'4 but has since been applied
to non-legislative rules. It is one thing, however, to say that an agency
may bind itself by its non-legislative rules;1 42 but it is quite another to
say that the President may bind agencies by his non-legislative rules. 143
If he can, the reach of the doctrine may depend on whether it is
grounded on considerations of constitutional or administrative due
process, 14 and on whether a non-legislative rule falls within the
45
"housekeeping" exception to the doctrine.
139. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) (Frankfurter, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. See 2 K. DAvS, upra note 51, § 7.21, at 98-105; Berger, supra note 52; Note supra note
52.
141. In the context of legislative rules, the doctrine reflects simply the force and effect of law
that is given such rules. Eg., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388-89 (1957); United States ex rel
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); see afro Note, JudcialEnforcement of.Admnirtrative
AAer ce to Express Regulations andEablsWd Customs, 23 GEo. WASH. L REv. 751 (1955).
142. See, ag., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (failure to publish "eligibility requirements" in compliance with internal agency manual requirement); United States v. Heffner, 420
F.2d 809, 811-12 (4th Cir. 1970). The doctrine thus easily embraces executive orders, which ordinarily satisfy even the APA's strict definition of "rule". See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976) ("agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret,

or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure or practice requirements of an
agency.")
143. See hgfra text accompanying notes 146-54.
144. See hfta text accompanying notes 155-75.
145. See I9% text accompanying notes 176-83.
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1. Rule of the Agency or the President? The doctrine that an
agency must follow its own rules reflects in part an equitable conclusion that "[h]e that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that
sword."' 46 Yet an executive order is imposed by outside authority typically with little or no agency participation. The equitable rationale for
requiring agencies to follow their own regulations therefore does not
suffice to bind them by executive orders.
This conclusion, however, takes insufficient account of the relationship between the President and the executive agencies. The President is the head of the executive branch and has the constitutional
power to appoint its senior executives.1 4 7 This power includes a power
of supervision to guarantee the "unitary and uniform execution of the
laws" and implies a power to remove insubordinate appointees in the
"purely executive" or non-independent agencies. 148 In fact, the executive's relationship is so close to these agencies that historically their acts
were regarded as his.14 9 On the other hand, by limiting the President's
power to remove officials from "quasi-judicial" agencies, the Supreme
Court has recognized that these agencies have substantial independence from the President. 5 0 Because the President's supervisory power
is strictly limited with respect to these agencies, it would be wrong to
consider his acts as acts of the independent agencies.
Nevertheless, for purposes of applying the doctrine that an agency
must follow its "own" rules, it would not strain logic or political theory
to take a "unitary" view of the purely executive agencies and the President, and thus to consider the President's rules as those of the agencies. 15 1 One court implicitly took this view when it explained
enforcement of executive agency compliance with an executive order as
"a specific application of the general principle that agencies may be
146. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

147. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
148. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
149. 'The President speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments in relation
to subjects which appertain to their respective duties... . [Wle consider the act of the war
department in requiring this reservation to be made, as being in legal contemplation the act of the
President." Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 PeL) 498, 513 (1839); c. United States v. Eliason, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 291, 301-02 (1842); 7 Op. Att'y Gem 453, 482 (1855). See generaly, Fairlie, upra

note 92.
150. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see aso Wiener v. United
States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
151. Ba see Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power ofthe Presidentto Execute the Laws, 46 TNN. L.
Ray. 757, 793-94 (1979).
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required to live up to their own rules." 152 Because the Reagan Order
governs only the non-independent agencies, the same view justifies application of the doctrine to agency compliance with the Order.
Alternatively, there is a simpler, although somewhat question-begging, reason for applying this doctrine to executive orders: Agencies
sometimes promulgate their own implementing rules that adopt, paraphrase, or incorporate by reference the essential requirements of the
executive order. For example, the Department of Transportation has
issued instructions to guide department staff in performing the regulatory evaluations required by the Reagan Order.153 When an agency
has implemented the Reagan Order in this fashion, the issue is simply
154
whether that agency is bound by its own rules or staff instructions.
2. Constitutionalor Administrative Due Process? Constitutional

due process may require agencies to follow even their own non-legislative rules. The constitutional due process theory holds that such rules
"embody a de facto recognition of minimum standards of procedural
decency"' 5 5 or, more broadly, that agency rule violations deny funda156
mental fairness.
No court has articulated a clear test for when this theory requires
agencies to follow their own rules; however, the reported opinions display certain common elements. Typically the cases involve adjudicative or investigatory proceedings that threaten constitutionally
protected property or liberty interests. 157 The rules or practices that are
152. Brookhaven Hous. Coalition v. Kunzig, 341 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The
doctrine was unnecessary to the result, however, because the court found that the executive order
was issued on statutory authority, which would have given it the force and effect of law. See aro
Brug supra note 21, at 508 n.278 (assuming that the doctrine can be invoked by parties with
standing to enjoin agency action that violates executive order).
153. Seessmra note 41.

154. Although the two issues seem logically related, the courts appear willing to consider them
independently. For example, inIn re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir.

1980), appellants charged the Department of Interior with violating both the Ford Order and the
Department's own implementing regulations by failing to prepare an Inflation Impact Statement
before promulgating surface mining regulations. Id at 1357. The court upheld the agency defense that the executive order was not judicially enforceable and also held that the agency had

adequately complied with its own regulations. The court did not suggest or consider that the first
defense was dispositive of the claim of agency violation of its own regulations. Cf Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1322 (8th Cir. 1981) (agency compliance with inter-

nal regulation permitting postponement of regulatory analysis for emergency regulation defeats
claim of agency violation of the Carter Order).
155. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYs., AImTnqisvNE LAw. CASES AND CoMMENTS 862 (4th

ed. 1960).
156. See Note, npvra note 52, at 654-55.
157. See, ag., United States ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (deportation
adjudication); Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1970) (informal adjudication of request for
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enforced confer protections or benefits, usually procedural, on individuals. 58 The Supreme Court also recently suggested that a person who
complains of an agency's violation of its own rules must have relied on
the rules to his detriment. 5 9 The more public, formal, and non-discretionary the rule, the more likely is such reliance. This is true because
the public is more likely to know of such a rule, to consider it in planning conduct, and to expect that the agency will follow it.
In United States v. Leahey, 60 for example, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit applied these principles to certain Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules. The IRS had publicly adopted a mandatory
staff procedure for issuing Miranda-likewarnings to the subjects of income tax investigations that could result in criminal prosecution. The
IRS thus invited subjects to rely on the warnings, or their absence, in
deciding how much information they would voluntarily disclose to the
IRS investigators. The court assumed that the taxpayer had relied on
the procedure and held that constitutional due process required the
IRS to follow its own rule. Constitutional due process thus suggests
that agencies are bound by those rules intended primarily to confer
protections or benefits on individuals in an adjudicatory or investigatory proceeding. The formality, publication, and mandatory language
of the rules may, in part, evidence such intent and reliance.
By this analysis, agencies are not bound to comply with the Reagan Order. First, the Order applies not to adjudication or investigation, but to rulemaking. Rulemaking affects large numbers of people
on generalized grounds. Less process is therefore constitutionally due
in rulemaking than in adjudication.161 It would require an extension of
deferment from overseas military duty); United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970) (investigation of income tax evasion leading to prosecution); Note, supra note 141, at 753, 758 (agency
compliance is traditionally enforced in adjudicatory settings in which property or liberty rights are
at stake). Of course, the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of
interests protected by the due process clause. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
158. See, eg., United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970). See generalo,3 B. MazINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra note
52, § 13.03[2], at 13-38 to 13-39.
159. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 753 (1979). Caceres claimed that the IRS had
violated unpublished staff instructions regarding wiretapping of investigative subjects. The Court
responded, without elaboration, that the due process clause was not implicated because Caceres
"cannot reasonably contend that he relied on the regulation, or that its breach had any effect on
his conduct." ld at 753.
160. United States v. ] ahey, 434 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1970).
161. See, eg., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224,245 (1973); Bi-Metallic Inv.
Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 9 n.5 (1st Cir.
1970) (persons affected by "legislative-like f4ct-inding" not entitled to same due process rights
available when agency is engaged in adjudication) (citing Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st
Cir. 1970)). The exception for the rare rulcmaking that affects a small number of persons on
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the case law holding that constitutional due process requires agencies
to follow their own rules to impose that requirement in rulemaking.
Second, the Order expressly disclaims an intent to confer "any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural," on private § parties. 162 Admittedly,
the Order aims at the reduction of individual regulatory burdens 63 and
directs agencies to give full attention to "comments of persons directly
affected by the rule in particular."' 164 These benefits or protections,
however, are arguably secondary to the managerial purposes stressed in
the Order's Preamble and reaffirmed in its provision on judicial review.165 Finally, private parties do not rely on the Order to their detriment because it creates no new role for them in rulemaking and neither
compels nor encourages any change in their conduct.
Constitutional due process, however, is not the only rationale that
courts have employed in requiring agencies to follow their own rules.
The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]gency violations of their own
regulations, whether ornot also in violationofthe Constitution, may well
be inconsistent with the standards of agency action which the APA directs the courts to enforce."' 66 The APA effectively establishes a standard of what might be called "administrative due process"'167 by
authorizing courts to set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion."'16 The failure of an agency to follow its own rule or consistent prior practice, absent an adequate
individual grounds, see Vermount Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(applying due process protections to rulemaking said to involve competing claims to a valuable
privilege), cenr dened, 434 U.S. 829 (1977), would rarely, if ever, apply to the major rules for
which RlAs are required by the Reagan Order because these by definition affect large numbers of
individuals and producers upon general grounds. See Exec. Order § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 127-28 (1982)
(defining "major rule").
162. Reagan Order, § 9,3 C.F.R. 133-34 (1982); see 2 K. DAVIS, smpra note 51, § 7.21, at 105.
163. Reagan Order, Preamble, 3 C.F.R. 127.(1982).
164. Id § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. 130.
165. Id Preamble & § 9, 3 C.F.R. 127, 133-34.
166. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754 (1979) (emphasis added) (citing Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) and Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957)). Both of the
latter cases invoked the then-applicable judicial review provision of the APA. 440 U.S. at 754 n.19
(noting APA basis of review in these cases).
167. See, eg., Weyemhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp.
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,48, 53 (D.C. Cir.), cerm denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); American Meat Inst. v.
EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 459 (7th Cir. 1975); see aso Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 344 F.
Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (even if agency breach of rule is "deemed less than a constitutional violation, it is in any event a breach of legal duty correctible in this proceeding"), revldon
otier groundr, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Albert, supra note 24, at 459 (administrative due
process doctrine is part of the "common law" of judicial review).
168. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1976).
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explanation, provesprimafacie that the agency's action is arbitrary and

capricious.
Administrative due process reaches further than constitutional due
process because it applies not just to adjudication or investigation but
to any agency action reviewable under the APA. Moreover, insofar as
administrative due process envisions rational and consistent, and not
simply fair, administrative decision making, it should require agencies
to follow any rules that substantially affect outcome. It goes beyond
rules intended to confer a procedural benefit or protection on which a
person relies to his detriment. 169 The intent behind a rule should be
relevant only to deciding whether it applies and whether it has been
violated.170

Nevertheless, the courts have continued for three reasons to use
intent and reliance as the test for determining when an agency must
follow its own rules. First, in many cases courts erroneously assume,
without discussion, that an agency's obligation to follow its own rules is
solely a requirement of constitutional due process. 171 Second, courts
have sometimes been reluctant to employ administrative due process
169. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE AND P. STRAUSS, ADMiNISTRATIvE LAW 393-95 (7th ed.
1979). See generall,, Note, supra note 51. This rationale for requiring agencies to follow their
own rules is closely related to the principle that agencies must adhere to their own adjudicative
precedents or provide reasoned explanations for departures. The latter principle, however, also
rests in part on the presumption that adjudicative agency precedents reflect a legislative policy
mandate that would be thwarted by an unexplained departure by the agency. See, e.g., Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1973). This presumption is not
directly relevant to agency disregard of non-legislative rules or agency procedural practices.
170. Note, supra note 52, at 632. ("Although an inquiry into the purpose behind a regulation
is essential to the determination of whether a regulation applies to a particular situation, such an
inquiry is irrelevant to the determination of whether an agency's refusal to enforce the regulation
in a situation to which it admittedly applies should be upheld."). Application of a rule that is
informal and precatory is discretionary with staff Therefore the decision to disregard such a rule
does not violate any command and usually cannot be considered outcome-determinative because
the rule expressly reserves the determination for staff. Compare Massachusetts Dep't of Corrections v. LEAA, 605 F.2d 21, 26-27 (Ist Cir. 1979) (agency not bound to adhere strictly to internal
review process) with Oglala Sioux Tribe ofIndians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707,718-19 (8th Cir. 1979)
(agency bound by "guidelines" that were published and mandatory on staff); #.' K. DAvis, ADlmrsRATEvn LAW TREATISE § 7.5, at 170 (Supp. 1980) ("If the agency retains discretion not to
follow the declared policy, the statement is not a rule.").
171. See United States v. Fitch Oil Co., 676 F.2d 673, 676 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982). In
other cases, the court confusingly imports the elements of the constitutional due process theory to
justify an administrative due process result. See, eg., United States v. Tobins, 512 F. Supp. 308
(D. Mass. 1981). In TabinR, the court ruled that the agency was bound by its publicly announced
policy of not auditing small petroleum resellers. The court relied on the administrative due process theory that "an agency's general obligations to avoid arbitrary action and to act in good faith
imply some duty of consistency with its public pronouncements in dealing with those subject to its
regulation." Id at 314. Nevertheless the court thought it necessary to find that the audit policy
was one on which the public "could reasonably and expectably rely," id at 315 (quoting United
States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1970)), although it is difficult to see what form such
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because they fear that rigid application of the doctrine that agencies
must follow their own rules may encourage the agencies to dilute those
rules or even to act without rules.17 2 Yet the Reagan Order furthers
political and policy goals from which the Administration would not
likely be deterred by judicial enforcement of the Order. It also is improbable that the prospect of judicial enforcement of the Order would
discourage agencies from issuing implementing rules and guidelines
because the agencies are already subject to OMB enforcement under
the Order.173 Third, courts appear to have misapplied the holding in
American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service.174 In American
Farm Lines, the Supreme Court tolerated an agency's violation of its

internal procedural rules partly because the rules "were not intended
primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in
the face of otherwise unfettered discretion."' 175 Analysis of American
FarmLines, however, suggests that the exception that it creates is nar-

rower than is generally recognized.
3. Mere Housekeeping? At issue in American Farm Lines were
rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required li-

cense applications to be accompanied by supporting statements containing detailed descriptions of shippers' efforts to obtain service from
existing carriers and the reasons for their failure to obtain such service.

American Farm Lines' supporting statement did not provide the required level of detail. The ICC nonetheless granted American Farm
reliance conceivably could have taken, because the policy did not alter or relax petroleum resellers' recordkeeping responsibilities or statutory duties in the conduct of sales.
172. See, eg., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979). One suspects that this
argument is largely a makeweight. Logically, it applies with equal force to all gratuitous agency
rules and arguably with special force to those rules that courts most often enforce on constitutional
due process grounds--rules that serve no agency purpose, but only protect or benefit private
parties.
173. Of course, the OMB enforcement mechanism itself may be a reason for courts not to
insist on agency compliance. The "Executive Department [has] the primary responsibility for
fashioning the appropriate remedy for the violation of its regulations," United States v. Caceres,
440 U.S. 741, 756 (1979), and the managerial provisions of the Reagan Order provide such a
remedy. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44. Moreover, the Orders putative preclusion of
judicial review suggests that the executive remedy was intended to be exclusive. Reagan Order,
§ 9, 3 C.F.R. 133-34 (1982). But these considerations relate to reviewability of agency violations of
the Order, a subject which is separately analyzed below. See pyl-a text accompanying notes 244364.
174. 397 U.S. 532 (1970).
175. Id at 538. In United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979, the Court cited American
Farm Lines in emphasizing that "[elven as a matter of administrative law .... it seems clear that
agencies are nor required, at the risk of invalidation of their action, to follow all of their rules,
even those properly classified as 'internar'." Id at 754 n.18. Seegenerafy 3 B. MEazus, 3. STMiN,
& J. GRU" supra note 52, § 13.0312], at 13-38.
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Lines' application. A group of carriers challenged the ICC's action,
charging the agency with failure to follow its own rule. A three-judge
court upheld the challenge and set aside the ICC order as "arbitrary
76
[and] capricious."'
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court. Rejecting the protesting carriers' argument that the rules were intended primarily to confer procedural benefits, the Court concluded that the rules were "mere
aids to the exercise of the agency's independent discretion. 1 77 The
Court held that, when necessary, an agency may relax procedural rules
for the orderly transaction of agency business and that such agency
action is not reviewable "'except upon a showing of substantial
prejudice. ,"78 It found no such prejudice'on the facts of the case; the
protesting carriers had ample information to make precise and informed objections to the licensing application. Nor, the Court emphasized, had the rule violation impaired the ICC's ability to make a
decision on the application; it had adequate information to make
necessary findings and to reach an "'informed and equitable'
decision. 179
Thus American FarmLines does not except all internal procedural
rules from the doctrine that agencies must follow their own rules. Nor
did the case limit the doctrine to just those rules that confer procedural
benefits or protections. Rather, the Court held that agency violation of
an internal procedural rule is not arbitrary and capricious absent substantial prejudice or impairment of agency decision making.3 0
176. Black Ball Freight Sere. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (W.D. Wash. 1969),
rev'd.sub nom. American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532 (1970).
177. American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Sere., 397 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1970).
178. Id at 539 (quoting NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1953)).
179. Id at 538.
180. The procedural rules at issue inAmeafcan Farm Liner were legislative. Thus the Court
disregarded the principle that agencies and the public alike are bound by legislative regulations
because such regulations have the force and effect of law. Professor Davis has dismissed the
decision in this regard as an "exception that is hard to interpret." 2 K. DAVIS, srupra note 51, at 99.
There is, however, some older judicial authority tolerating an agency violation of a statute that is
"directory" rather than mandatory, see French v. Edwards, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 506,511 (1871), i.e.,
"merely a guide for the conduct of business and for orderly procedure rather than a limitation of
power." IA C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRuCrION § 25.03, at 299 (1972). More

recently, the Court emphatically rejected the proposition that procedural legislative regulations
are less binding law than substantive legislative regulations. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S.
785, 790 (1981) (per curiam) ("A court is no more authorized to overlook the valid regulation
requiring that applications be in writing than it is to overlook any other valid requirement for the
receipt of benefits."). Accordingly,Amenican Farm Liner should probably be regarded as an aberration insofar as it deviates from the principle that legislative rules are binding law. The application of its holding should be confined to non-legislative agency rules and pronouncements.
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The Reagan Order does not fall within the American Farm Lines
exception. It imposes cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness requirements
that the OLC has accurately characterized as "substantive in nature."1 1 The Order binds the agencies and circumscribes the exercise
of agency discretion. The OLC conceded this point when it described
the legal issue raised by the Order as whether "the President may require Executive agencies to be guided by principles of cost-benefit
analysis even when an agency, acting without presidential guidance,
might choose not to do so."182 An agency's violation of the Order

would be an error in the promulgation of a regulation. This error
could substantially prejudice those whom the regulation burdens or
benefits by substantively altering the regulation that would otherwise
have issued in conformity with the Order. Finally, because a major
' 18 3
purpose of the Order is to "insure well-reasoned regulations,"
agency disregard of its requirements could impair rational efficiencybased decision making. In short, administrative due process requires
agencies to follow the Reagan Order;, the Order does not fall within the
mere housekeeping exception established by Ameican Farm Lines.
IV. THRESHOLD REQuIREmENT: Is THE REAGAN ORDER
PRIVATELY ENFORCEABLE?

The foregoing discussion of the merits suggests that the Reagan
Order binds agencies as a matter of administrative due process. But to
convince a court to reach the merits, a private plaintiff must satisfy a
number of overlapping and indistinct "threshold" requirements for judicial review of administrative action.184 He must first demonstrate
that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.1 85 He must then
181. OLC MEMoANDUM, spra note 21, at 5.

182. Id at 6. In contrast, an executive order establishing guidelines for federal employees
"imposed no hard and fast directives on... federal employees; and ... left large areas for the
exercise of discretion at levels below the summit." The courts therefore characterized the order as
an unenforceable managerial "project" of the President. Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
183. Reagan Order, Preamble, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
184. See, eg., B. ScHwARnz supra note 55, at 430, W. GE.nHoRN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS,
note 169, at 917; 5 B. MmmS, J. STmN & J. GRuFF, npranote 52, § 43.02. These threshold requirements include a potpourri of timing requirements, variously and not always precisely
defined as finality, exhaustion, ripeness, and primary jurisdiction. Claims that an agency has violated the Reagan Order in connection with issuing or rescinding a final regulation would normally
satisfy these timing requirements. They and all other threshold requirements except reviewability
are also satisfied when such claims are raised in defense of an enforcement proceeding. The focus
below is therefore on the remaining threshold requirements applicable to pre-enforement review
of final agency action that allegedly violated the Reagan Order.
185. See genr) 5 B. Mmas, L STm LJ.
& GRUFF, upa note 52, § 45.
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demonstrate that he has standing to present the claim.'8 6 He may also

have to establish that a cause of action exists under the executive order.18 7 Finally, he must show that judicial review is available,88or, as it
is sometimes loosely phrased, that his claim is "reviewable."'
Courts have repeatedly dismissed private actions to enforce managerial executive orders at these thresholds. The decisions, however,

commonly apply the threshold requirements without adequately considering the context in which the plaintiff raises the claim that an
agency has violated an order. Persons adversely affected by agency action often can assert independent bases for subject matter jurisdiction'8 9 and standing' 9° to obtain review of the action. These bases may
allow such persons to raise claims of invalidity that may not themselves
give rise to jurisdiction and standing. The APA also provides for review of agency action without requiring that a cause of action exist
under an executive order. The threshold obstacles to private enforce-

ability of managerial executive orders thus are reduced in many cases
to the requirement of reviewability. Whether a claim is reviewable de-

pends on a functional analysis of the impact of judicial review on the
institutions involved-the agencies, the courts, and the President. This

impact, in turn, varies with the scope of review.1 91
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The first question any private action to review agency compliance
with an executive order poses is whether a federal court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of plaintiff's claim.192 One approach to answer186. Id § 50.
187. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 966 (1976); see also Acevedo v. Nassau County, N.Y., 500 F.2d 1078, 1084 (2d Cir. 1974)
(finding neither an intent nor a compelling need to create private right of action under executive
order requiring the GSA to consider the availability of low income housing in selecting federal
building sites); In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 452 F. Supp. 327, 334 (D.D.C. 1978), aj'd
bnpar, rey'd inpart, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (no inferred private right of action for enforcement of Ford Order).
188. See, eg., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970)
("whether judicial review of the [agency] action has been precluded"); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159, 166 (1970) (whether review has been precluded or "whether nonreviewabiity can fairly be
inferred"); Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1186 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (nonreviewability constitutes the third part of a three-part test for standing). See generaly B. MEzInEs, J. STiNn & J. GRUbi, supra note 52, § 44.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 192-209.
190. See ifra text accompanying notes 210-31.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 244-364.
192. Questions of the committal of agency action by law to unreviewable agency discretion
and ofpreclusion ofjudicial review, see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976), are sometimes loosely described
as 'jurisdictiou," although subject matter jurisdiction is technically present. This section treats
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ing this question looks exclusively to the executive order and the au-

thority for the order. An order issued pursuant to a specific grant of
statutory authority itself satisfies federal question

93

jurisdiction. The

specific delegation of legislative authority makes the order the law
under which a claim of agency violation arises, 19 4 just as legislative regulations are the law under which claims of agency violations of the
regulations arise for purposes of federal question jurisdiction.19 5 On
the other hand, when an executive order lacks specific statutory authority, courts have held that it does not attain the status of a law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Accordingly, they have
dismissed claims of violation of such orders for want of subject matter
jurisdiction.'9
The foregoing discussion of the merits, however, suggests that an
executive order can be vested with the force and effect of law absent
specific statutory authority. In the absence of congressional disapproval, independent executive authority under the Constitution may in
certain circumstances give executive orders the force and effect of law.
Where it does, courts should view the executive order as law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction, despite its lack of specific statutory authority. Alternatively, the court should look behind the order to
the Constitution for purposes of federal question jurisdiction.'17
subject matter jurisdiction in the technical and precise sense. The article deals with reviewability
separately below. The amendment to the APA that waived the sovereign immunity defense in
actions against the United States seeking relief other than money damages removed another "jurisdictional" problem. 5 U.S.C. § 702, amended by Pub. L. No. 94-574 § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976).
Prior to the amendment, courts dismissed some suits seeking review of agency violations of executive orders on the ground that the courts had no jurisdiction over actions to which the United
States had not consented. See Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 454
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1276-77
(8th Cir. 1969), eezt denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
193. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1982).
194. See, eg., Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967). Seegeneraly 13 C. WRIHT, A. MU.LE, & E. CooPER, supra note 24, § 3563, at
417 & n.1l; Noyes, =pra note 1, at 862.
195. See generally 13 C. Wciutrr, A. MiLLER & E. CooPER, supra note 24, § 3563, at 417 &
n.11; 5 B. MEznEs, J. STN & . GRuFF, supra note 52, 45-35 n.49.
1%. See, eg., Kuhn v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Branch 5,570 F.2d 757,760 (8th Cir.
1978); Dreyfus v. Von Finch.534 F.2d 24,28-29 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); Local
1498 v. AFGE, 522 F.2d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1975).
197. See Noyes, mpra note 1,at 859 n.90 (conceding, however, that this is a "novel" jurisdictional theory because most claims that arise under the Constitution involve the deprivation of
constitutional rights). Of course, a claim that an agency has violated an executive order in violation of constitutional due process arises directly under the fifth amendment to the Constitution
whether the order is law oi not, and thus raises a federal question. Cf John Doe Corp. v. Miller,
499 F. Supp. 378, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (violation of non-legislative rules). But this constitutional
due process theory does not apply to agency violations of the Reagan Order for the reasons stated
above. See supra text accompanying notes 155-65.
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For example, in In re Neagle,19 8 for the purposes of a federal
habeas corpus statute, the Supreme Court treated as law an executive
order that lacked specific statutory authority. Similarly, in OldDominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin,1 9 9 the Court treated a managerial executive order without specific statutory authority as "relevant federal law"
for purposes of the supremacy clause of the Constitution.20 0 If such
executive orders can be considered law for purposes of a federal habeas
corpus statute and article VI of the Constitution, it may be reasonable
to consider them law for purposes of the federal question jurisdictional
20 1
statute and article m of the Constitution.
A simpler approach to the jurisdiction question is to consider in
context the claim that an agency has violated an executive order. Typically, a plaintiff will assert that the violation invalidates some agency
action to which the executive order applied, such as the issuance of a
final legislative regulation. Federal courts have jurisdiction to review
such agency action because the Administrative Orders Review Act 20 2,
or the enabling statute that authorized the action, expressly creates jurisdiction, 203 or because the enabling act constitutes federal law under
which an action for nonstatutory review arises.204 The jurisdiction thus
198. 135 U.S. I (1890).,
199. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
200. The managerial executive order at issue cited a general housekeeping statute that the
Court has since refused to treat as a delegation of legislative authority for other purposes. See
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309-12 (1979).
201. Contra, Kuhn v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Branch 5, 570 F.2d 737, 761 n.7 (8th
Cir. 1978) (distinguishing Old Domin'on as a case involving pre-emption rather than jurisdiction
without explaining how it makes any difference).
202. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2353 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This Act provides for direct appeal to a
court of appeals of certain final orders of the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal
Energy Commission, Secretary of Agriculture, the Federal Maritime Commission or Maritime
Administration, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as
well as final orders, rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Although the
Act refers generally only to the review of final "orders," the courts have read this generously to
include rules and regulations issued by the relevant agencies. See generally 5 B. MEZINES, J.
STmIN & J. GRUFF, supra note 52, at 45-57 & n.36.
203. Seegenerally 5 B. Mezms, 3. STEM & J.GRus, .wpra note 52, 45-48 n.4 (listing representative enabling statute provisions creating jurisdiction to review agency action). The generous
interpretation give the term "orders" under the Administrative Orders Review Act is also given
the term in enabling statutes that provide for judicial review. See, ag., Investment Co. Inst. v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1276-78 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also ira
note 207.
204. Seegenerally 5 B. MEzINis, J. STUiN & J.GRuFF, supra, note 52, §§ 45.0312) & [3]. Traditionally, "statutory review"--review authorized by a statute that specifically states that actions
of a named agency may be reviewed or that generally authorizes judicial review of adminitrative
action--has been distinguished from "nonstatuory review"--review authorized by a grant ofgeneral jurisdiction that does not by its terms refer to judicial review of administrative action. See
generally W. GELLHoRN, C. BYsE & P. STRAUSs, supra note 169, at 917-37; 5 B. MEZINES, J.
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available for judicial review of the final regulation extends to any claim
that the regulation is invalid, including the claim that the agency violated an executive order in issuing the regulation. In other words, the

court looks to the agency action in deciding jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to
hear the claim of violation should properly be within, or at least pendent to,20 5 jurisdiction to review the agency action.

A court would be especially likely to grant jurisdiction under this
theory for review of a claim that an agency violated the Reagan Order.
Regulations subject to the Order are often subject to statutory review.
For example, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt,20 6 the court
found that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 specifically conferred jurisdiction to review final regulations of the Department of Transportation.2o7 The court then went on to reach the merits of the claim that the
agency had violated the Carter Order and its own implementing regulations. 208 Similarly, in Independent Meat Packers Association v.
Butz, 2D9 plaintiff sought nonstatutory review in district court of legislative regulations issued pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Act of

1946. The plaintiff asserted that the challenge arose under that act for
purpose of federal question and trade and commerce jurisdiction. The

court accepted the plaintiff's jurisdictional argument and heard the
claim, among others, that the agency had violated the Ford Order by
issuing the regulations without adequate economic analysis. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction should pose no obstacle to review of agency
compliance with the Reagan Order.
SmTly,& J. GRuFF, srpra note 52, §43.02[2] at 43-12 to 43-20. The latter form of review is called
"nonstatutory" because it evolved from common law and equity precedents. It is now governed
exclusively by statute in federal courts. Id at 53-15; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1361 (Supp. IV
1980). The APA expressly distinguishes between these alternatives in prescribing the "form of
proceeding for judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976).
205. See 13 C. WsoHT, A. Mn.ELR & E. Coopnx, .pra note 24, § 3567, at 444-45. Although
pendent jurisdiction usually extends from an anchor federal claim to a pendent state claim, it also
comprehends pendent "federal" claims that are for some reason not otherwise within the original
jurisdiction of the federal court. Id (e.g., federal claims that did not satisfy the former amount in
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a)); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp.
442,461 n.36 (S.D. Fla. 1980), mod sub nomL Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th
Cir. 1982) (federal claims otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of appeals).
206. 645 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1981).
207. 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976) (permitting review in the courts of appeals of "any order,
affirmative or negative"). The court ruled that because there was i sufficient administrative record
to permit review, "order" should be construed to include a regulation promulgated by notice-andcomment rulemaking. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309,1313-14 (8th Cir.
1981). The RIA for a major regulation under the Reagan Order itself provides such a record.
208. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1322 (8th Cir. 1981).
209. 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975), cer. denied,424 U.S. 966 (1976) (jurisdiction alleged under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337).
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Standing.

Since the 1970 trilogy of Supreme Court administrative law standing decisions,210 a party challenging an administrative action must
meet both constitutional and prudential standing requirements. The
constitutional requirement is that the plaintiff suffered "injury in fact"
as a result of the defendant's acts. The injury must be redressable by a

favorable decision of the court.211 The prudential requirement is that
the plaintiff must assert an interest that "is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question. '212
The plaintiff who complains that an agency has violated the Reagan Order should ordinarily be able to satisfy the constitutional "injury
in fact" requirement. Persons regulated by administrative regulations
can assert compliance costs as injury in fact;2 13 persons protected by the
regulations can assert economic, environmental, or social costs from

the regulated activity. Such injury is fairly traceable to the promulgating agency's failure to comply with the Reagan Order; the Order's procedural requirements help assure that agencies consider the costs and
benefits of regulation in the administrative decision making process,
and the Order's substantive requirements help to minimize cost and to

maximize net benefits. 214 Also, it is likely that a favorable judicial decision will redress the injury. The decision will at least assure that the
agency takes the regulation's costs and benefits into account and could,

if the court enforces the Order's substantive requirements, prevent the

promulgation of cost-inefficient regulations.
210. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970).
211. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-500 (1975); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 37-39 (1976).
212. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). While the
"zone of interests" requirement has been much criticized in the literature, see, e.g., Davis, Stand.
ing, 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 69, 81 (1977), it has not been disavowed by the Supreme Court. It is
still applied by most lower courts, though at times unenthusiastically. See, eg., Copper & Brass
Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stressing absence of "cogent explanation" of test by Supreme Court
and lower courts' need for guidance); Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.),
cer. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981).
213. See, eg., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir.
1980).
214. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 1003-04 (5th Cir. 1981) (injury
in fact caused by the Corps of Engineers' use of defective cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether
a project will be constructed); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1975)
(finding that "procedural injury implicit" in agency's failure to prepare environmental impact
statement is sufficient injury in fact to create standing).
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Incontrast, the zone of interests requirement poses a serious obstacle to standing for plaintiffs who complain that an agency has violated
the Reagan Order. In Independent Meat Packers Association v. Butz,
for example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit not only refused to review agency compliance with the Ford Order on the grounds
that the Order lacked the force and effect of law, but also expressed
"grave doubts" that plaintiffs had standing to seek such review. 2 15 The
prudential test for standing "affords a comfortably vague means of excluding litigation that casts an overpowering aura of officious intermeddling. ' 216 The test thus has special appeal for courts that wish to
avoid interfering with the "personal" policies of the President.
More specifically, there are two reasons that the zone of interests
test may deny standing to plaintiffs who complain that an agency has
violated a managerial executive order. First, the plaintiffs interest may
217
fall outside the zone of interests protected or regulated by the Order.
This, however, would not necessarily result in a denial of standing to
plaintiffs who complain that an agency has violated the Reagan Order
because the judicial review provision of the Order could be read to
disavow any intent to benefit private parties.213 Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration designed the Order to reduce the burden of regulation and to assure well-reasoned regulations by imposing procedural
and substantive requirements on the rulemaking process. 21 9 "ITihe interest in not being subjected to unwarranted regulation can readily be
identified as an interest protected by the asserted limits on regulation." 220 Thus, the zone of interests created by the Order is quite
broad, notwithstanding its judicial review provision.
Moreover, the Order also directs agencies to give full attention to
"the comments of persons directly affected by the rule in particular," 221
a requirement intended at least in part for the benefit of such persons.
In NEPA cases, a similar requirement has been held to establish a zone
of interests within which such persons fall.2 2 These requirements of
215. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 n.21 (8th Cir. 1975), cent
denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976).
216. 13 C. WRioHT, A. Mn.LER & E. CooPin, supra note 24, § 3531.
217. See, ,g., Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 n.21 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Acevedo v. Nassau County, N.Y. 500 F.2d 1078, 1082-83 (2d Cir.
1974) (plaintiffs complaining of violation of statutory executive order lack injury in fact and fall

outside the orders zone of interest).
218. Reagan Order, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 133-34 (1982).
219. Id Preamble, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).

220. 13 C. WioR, A. MU.aF & E. CooPER, supra note 24, § 3531, at 201; see aiso NCAA v.
Califano. 622 F.2d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir. 1980).

221. Reagan Order, § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982).
222. See, eg., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 1975).
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the Reagan Order of course also benefit the public at large. The zone
of interests test, however, requires only that the plaintiff show
that he is
223
an intended beneficiary, not necessarily the. primary one.
But, even if an order arguably protects a plaintiff's interest, some
evidence indicates that only statutes create "zones" for standing purposes. The APA provision from which the Court originally derived the
zone of interests test speaks only of persons "adversely affected or ag'224
grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.
If the zone of interests test is a test for legislative intent to provide redress for injury, 225 executive intent is irrelevant, and the absence of
specific statutory authority for the Reagan Order forecloses a finding of

the requisite legislative intent. If, on the other hand, any pronouncement with the force and effect of law, including executive orders in the

"twilight zone" of lawmaking authority, creates a zone of interests, a
plaintiff complaining of an agency's violation of the Reagan Order still
226
has a standing problem, because the Reagan Order lacks such force.
These applications of the "zone of interests" test, however, focus
erroneously on an executive order alone. Professor Bruff has suggested
that "[w]here an independent basis for private standing exists,. . . the

courts should review compliance with an order" as long as the plaintiff
can assert injury in fact from noncompliance.22 7 If the plaintiff sustained injury in fact to an interest that is within the zone of interests of
an enabling statute or other legislation pertinent to the agency action,
and therefore has standing to assert particular claims in connection
with review of the action, he may also be able "to raise other inadequacies.., based upon the 'public interest' in requiring government officials to discharge faithfully their statutory duties" 228 in a non-arbitrary
223. Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
224. 5 U.S.C. § 702(1976) (emphasis added); see Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). But see Comment, Equal mployment Opportunities and Govern-

ment Contracting: Three Theoiesfor ObtainingJudicialReview ofExecutive Order Number 11,246
Determinations, 1972 WIs. L. Rnv. 133, 150 (order with the force and effect of law is a "statute"

for purposes of APA provision) [hereinafter cited as Comment, EqualEmployment Opportunities];
cf.Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1972), ert. de.nied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973) (United

Nations Resolution creates zone of interests). In Diggs, however, the United Nations Resolution
may have been accorded the dignity of statute by virtue of the treaty by which the United States
entered the United Nations, which carries the force and effect of law under the supremacy clause.
225. See 5 B. MEZINES, J. STEN & J. GRUFF, supra note 52, at 50-23 to 50-24.
226. See supra notes 51-138 and accompanying text.
227. Bruff, supra note 21, at 508 n.278.
228. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see, eg., Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737, 740 n.15 (1972) ("the interests of the general public"); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,477 (1940) ("any relevant question of law"); Iowa Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 511 F.2d 1288, 1293-94 (D.C. Cir.) ("any objec-
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and non-capricious fashion.2 29 The strongest case for such "derivative
standing" exists when Congress has expressly authorized statutory review and thus indicated that at least some persons have standing to
obtain review.2 0 Derivative standing, however, has also been assumed
in a nonstatutory review action that raised, inter alia, the claim that an
agency violated the Ford Order in issuing final regulations. 231
In short, plaintiffs may be able to surmount the standing obstacle
to review of agency violations of the Reagan Order by looking beyond
the Order itself to the agency action that violated the Order. If a plaintiff has standing to challenge the agency action, on any ground, there is
case authority for also allowing him to present the claim that the
agency violated the Reagan Order.
C. Cause of Action.
Another threshold obstacle to judicial review of agency compliance with executive orders is the requirement that the plaintiff state a
cause of action. Courts have consistently refused to infer private rights
of action against private defendants under executive orders,2 32 thereby
evidencing doubt that the executive has the power to create private
rights of action by executive orders. 233 This reluctance to infer private
rights of action extends to actions against government defendants
charged with violating such orders. 23 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs who claim that an
tion to the Board's decision"), ce deimed, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); Lukens Steel Co. v. Kreps, 477 F.
Supp. 444,446 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In Sierra Club .Adams, however, allof the grounds asserted
against the agency arose under the same statute. This may limit the reach of the "derivative
standing" which the Court in that case apparently endorsed. See Citizens Comm. Against Interstate Rte. 625 v. Lewis, 542 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Ohio 1982); see also 5 B. MEMN.S, J.SmvNi & J.
GRuFF, jupra note 52, § 50.04; Fuchs, Prerequsftes to Judicial Review of Adminfrtrative Agency
Action, 51 IND. LJ.817, 932 (1976); Note, The New Law of 7Treshold Standing: The Effect oJ
Sierra Club on Jus Tend"andon Government Contracts, 1973 DUKE L.J. 218, 230-31.
229. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2XA) & (D) (1976).
230. See Washington Utilities & Transp:Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142,1146 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). The Supreme Court decision that first approved this theory involved
statutory review that Congress had extended to any license or permit applicant and "any other
person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by a decision of the Commission granting or refusing any such application." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77
(1940) (quoting Section 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934).
231. See American Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (reaching
merits of claim after finding standing to raise statutory claims under statute which authorized the

regulations).
232. See, ,g., Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elem. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964). See generafly Noyes,
mupra note 1, at 848-49 n.43.
233. Noyes, zupra note 1, at 868.69, 876 n.154; Note, supra note 1, at 55.
234. See cases cited .p
note 187.
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agency violated the Ford Order would have to demonstrate that the
order was intended to create a private right of action.235
This conclusion is unfounded, however, because the APA creates a
private right of action for judicial review of final agency action, 236 and
thus obviates the need to infer one from an executive order. The
Supreme Court's decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 237 suggests the
proper analysis of the cause of action question.
Chrysler sued to prevent agency disclosure of information that it
had submitted to the government. It asserted a private cause of action
under the Freedom of Information Act (a so-called "reverse FOIA"
suit), and, in the alternative, an implied cause of action under the
Trade Secrets Act.238 The Court ruled that Chrysler had no private
right of action on either theory because the Freedom of Information
Act is a prodisclosure statute and because nothing in the Trade Secrets
239
Act indicates a legislative intent to create a private right of action.
The Court added, however, that it was unnecessary to infer a private
right of action from the Trade Secrets Act because review of the government's decision to disclose the information was already available
under the APA. 40 The APA both authorizes review of agency action
at the instance of injured parties--to the extent that review is not precluded by statute and that the action is not otherwise committed to
agency discretion by law-and permits the reviewing court to set aside
agency action it finds "not in accordance with law."'' 4 Consequently,
the Court granted review of the agency's disclosure decision to determine whether disclosure was in accordance with the Trade Secrets
Act.242
235. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 966 (1976). The court noted that "[tio infer a private right of action here creates a serious
risk that a series of protracted lawsuits brought by persons with little at stake would paralyze the
rulemaking functions of federal administrative agencies." Id This concern seems oddly misplaced on the facts of that case. The meat packers were challenging beef grading standards that
directly regulated their business. They challenged the standards in part on the ground that the
agency had not adequately considered the impact of the standards on the cost and productivity of
the business, as required by the Ford Order.
236. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). See, eg., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318-19 (1979);
Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692, 697, 698 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to infer a cause of action under
the Veterans Administration Act, but finding a private cause of action for judicial review under
the APA), rehk dened, Nos. 79-3128, 79-3205, (9th Cir. May 6, 1982); Society Hill Civic Ass'n v.
Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1055 (3d Cir. 1980).
237. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
239. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 292, 316-17.
240. Id at 317.
241. Id at 318 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 & 706(2Xa) (1976)).
242. Id at 318-19.
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A plaintiff therefore has a cause of action under the APA for judicial review of an agency's violation of an executive order. He can assert either that the non-complying agency action is not "in accordance
with law" on the theory that the order is "law," or that the violative

'243
agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion."

Because the previous analysis of "the merits" concluded that the Rea-

gan Order is not law, the latter is the proper theory of the APA cause of
action for judicial review of agency violations of the Reagan Order.

But the cause of action under the APA is subject to the requirements
that the APA imposes. Among these is reviewability.
D. Reviewability of the Reagan Order.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that there is a "basic presumption of review" that can be overcome "only upon a showing of
'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent." 244
Nonetheless, even without such evidence of preclusion, a court may

still conclude that some part or all of an agency action is committed to
the absolute and therefore unreviewable discretion of the agency. 245

The Supreme Court has cautioned that courts are to apply this exception to reviewability only in the rare case in which "'there is no law to
apply.'

"2A6

Yet, whether there is law to apply provides only a starting

point. Courts invoking this exception ultimately base their decision on
a functional analysis of how the availability of review would affect the

agency and the courts.247 Similarly, even where review is arguably precluded by statute, the courts' insistence on "clear and convincing evi243. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1976).
244. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S.
367, 380 (1962)g. Even clear and convincing evidence of a legislative intent to bar judicial review
must yield to nonfrivolous constitutional clims that the agency has exceeded its jurisdiction. See
generafly W. G.LLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 169, at 938-47. Because this article
has assumed the lawfulness of the Reagan Order and has concluded that due process alone does
not require agencies to follow the Order, this exception to preclusion is inapplicable.
245. 5 U.S.C. § 701(aX2) (1976). See Saferstein, Nonreviewabilify: A FunctionalAnalysisof
"Commtted To Agency Dircretion-, 82 HARv. L REv. 367 (1968).
246. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (citing S. REP.
No. 752,79th Cong, Ist Sess. 26 (1945)).
247. See, eg., Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1971) (functional analysis of
strength of claim, injury, interference with agency function, and extent of agency discretion);
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249-51 (1st Cir. 1970) (functional analysis of amenability of
issues to judicial review, plaintiff's need for judicial protection, and impact of review on agency
effectiveness); Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 4-7 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.) (functional
analysis of practical requirements of the agency action at issue, the availability of standards
against which to measure it, and the utility ofjudicial review); see aso Saferstein, supra note 245.
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dence" of preclusion leads to a functional analysis in which the
statutory language is merely one factor.248
1. Preclusion of Judicial Review. The Reagan Order disavows
any intent to create "any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law" against the government. 249 It therefore can be read
to contain an express preclusion of review. The "legislative history" of
the Order--the OLC legal opinion approving the Order-underscores
the President's intent to keep the enforcement of the Order out of the
federal courts. The OLC concluded that "[t]he effect of this provision
is to preclude direct judicial review of an agency's compliance with the
Order." 250 The courts have given preclusive effect 251 to a less explicit
preclusion in the Carter Order.2 52 Additionally, the Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit found an implied preclusion of judicial review in
the Ford Order, which said nothing about judicial review. 253 By comparison, the express provision of the Reagan Order seems to evince a
preclusive intent sufficient to overcome the usual presumption of
reviewability.
Two considerations point in the other direction, however, which
together may raise sufficient ambiguity to force the reviewability analysis into the "committed to discretion" category of nonreviewability.
First, this sentence follows the Reagan Order's putative preclusion of
review: "The determinations made by agencies under Section 4 of this
Order [RIAs] and any regulatory impact analyses for any rule, shall be
made part of the whole record of agency action in connection with the
rule." 254 The APA mandates that "the court shall review the whole
record. '255 The Order therefore places an RIA before a court that is
reviewing a final "major" rule, despite the apparent preclusion of judicial review.
This inclusion in the record of the RIA produces no inconsistency
when the governing regulatory statute either requires an agency to follow efficiency criteria like those in the Order or prohibits it from doing
248. For this reason, some commentators have concluded that there is no real distinction between the two categories of nonreviewability which have been enacted in Section 701(a) of the
APA. See, eg., Saferstein, supra note 245, at 377 n.43; B. ScHwAr.z, supra note 55, at 454.
249. Reagan Order, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 133-34 (1982).
250. OLC Maon4ON DuM, .upra note 21, at 12.

251. American Meat Inst. v. Bergland, 459 F. Supp. 1308, 1315 (D.D.C. 1978) (dictum).
252. Carter Order, siqra note 27, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979) ("[this order] is not intended to
create delay in the process or provide new grounds for judicial review").
253. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975) ("the President did not undertake or intend to create any role for the judiciary in the implementation of
Executive Order No. 11,821."), cert. deited, 424 U.S. 966 (1976).
254. Reagan Order, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 133-34 (1982).
255. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
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so. When the Order's substantive requirements track a statute, their
violation is reviewable because it is also a violation of the statute.
When the statute prohibits the application of such requirements, the
RIA is irrelevant. 256 But when the statute is silent concerning the Order's efficiency criteria, or makes cost only one of several factors that
the agency must consider in its rulemaking, it is difficult to reconcile
the Order's preclusive. language and its directive that RIAs be made
part of the whole record for review.
Critical comment on the same preclusion-inclusion dichotomy in
both the Regulatory Flexibility Act25 7 and proposed regulatory reform
legislation that would require regulatory analysis has highlighted this
difficulty. Conceptually, a reconciliation of preclusion and inclusion of
analysis in the record is possible. 258 As a practical matter, however, for
a court to read but not to evaluate the analysis would require heroic
forebearance. As Dean Verkuil asked concerning preclusion-inclusion
provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act: "Ifthe... [analysis] is so
poor as to be worthless, or is prepared manifestly in bad faith, is a
2 59
reviewing court to ignore challenges to . . . [its] validity . ..7?"
Judge Leventhal of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, after initially assuming that preclusion and inclusion could be
reconciled, eventually concluded that preclusion of judicial review of
regulatory impact analysis that is included in the record "is equivalent
to the unringing of a bell"; it is impossible as a practical matter.26°
256. See Regzuory Robrm Legisiation: Hearingson S. 262, S. 755 S. 445, S. 93 Before the

Senate Comm on GovernmentaiAffas, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 27 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Regutatory Reform Hearings].
257. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-62 (Supp. IV 1980); t. 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a(eX1)(B), 57a(eXSXCX1976),
construedin American Optometric Ass'n v. FTC, 626 F.2d 896, 905-06 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(inclusionexclusion provisions are "mutually contradictory"; court will therefore consult included material
but refrain from insisting upon unreasonable detail from the agency in such material).
258. If the analyses are patently inconsistent with the agency's explanation of the rule
itself, the court may well ask whether the agency has provided a reasoned explanation
for its action in adopting the rule. But... the court must base its decision on the rule
itself, the record, and the statement of basis and purpose, not on the contents or conclusions of the regulatory analysis.
HR. REP. No. 1393, 96th Cong., 2d Ses. 44 (1980); see also Hearingson ReguatoryR form Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1,at 20 (1979) (statement of Judge H.
Leventhal) (absence of or inadequacy in regulatory analysis is not itself a basis for nullifying
action, but can be considered in deciding whether agency engaged in reasoned decision making);
Regu1aory Rform Hearings,supra note 256, pt. 2, at 578-79 (Statement of Administrative Conference of U.S.).
259. Verkuil,A CriticalGuide to the Regulatory .eRxZii.ty Act, 1982 DuKE LJ.213, 262.
260. CompareProceedgsoftheNationa Coferenceon FederalRegulafto" Roadsto Reform,
32 AD.L. REV. 123, 293-94 (1980) (statement by Judge H. Leventhal on Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings] with Hearingson Regulatory Reform Bore the Senate Comm on the
Judqar, .pra note 258, pt. 1,at 20 (statement by Judge ILLeventhal on May 10, 1979). See also
Regulatory Rearm Hearings, upra note 256, pt. 1, at 307, 363 (testimony of Chairman Ferris of
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Judge Bazelon, of the same court, has also suggested that notwithstand-

ing the apparent express preclusion of review, an agency "would be
obliged to consider all relevant data developed by the regulatory analysis, and courts would review any serious departures from this obliga-

tion. '261 It is therefore likely that the Reagan Order's preclusion of

judicial review of regulatory analysis that is made part of the record
will be futile.2 62 Even if that conclusion may be "somewhat overstated," as the Administrative Conference of the United States has

stated in response to criticisms of similar review provisions of proposed
regulatory reform legislation, 263 it may nevertheless be sufficient to
make the Order's putative preclusion of review less than "clear and
2

convincing." "4
-A second reason for regarding the Order's preclusion as ineffective
is that it is doubtful that the executive can by #?se dxit insulate itself
from judicial review. The APA provision on nonreviewability refers
expressly to "statutes" precluding review, in contrast to its immediately
succeeding reference to commitment of agency action to unreviewable
discretion "by law."265 This choice of language suggests that outright
preclusion of review is solely a legislative prerogative.
Furthermore, executive preclusion of review of compliance with its
rules would effectively vitiate the controls that such rules place on executive discretion. An order that is a valid exercise of independent exec-

utive power, absent statutory authority, authorizes executive action
without any limits or standards originating in a statutory delegation.
Limits and standards for such action must therefore originate in the
the Federal Communications Commission) ("fn]o judicial review is not really an option" when
regulatory analysis is part of the rulemaking record); pt. 2, at 408 (statement of H. Williams,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission); pt. 1, at 1204-05 (statement C. Carey, President
of National Food Processors Association) (expressing concern about the "considerable uncertainty
[that] would be created as to the relationship between a regulatory analysis and the requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act.").
261. Regulatory R 7or Hearigs, supra note 256, pt. 2, at 27-28 (statement by Judge D.
Bazelon).
262. See Gelihorn, RBorm as Totem-A Skeptical iew, REO. May-June 1979, at 23, 24
("[J]udicial review will somehow be made available. The only question is whether this fact is
recognized now or after numerous appeals and several years of uncertainty.")
263. Regulator RefOm Hearings,supra note 256, pt. 2, at 578.
264. In fact, the probable futility of the Order's preclusion provision raises the question of
whether the President really intended "backdoor" judicial review of limited scope to assist in the
enforcement of some provisions of the Order. One of the authors of the Carter Order wrote that,
notwithstanding its disclaimer of any intent to provide new grounds for review," its "theory...
was simply to use normal judicial review to force agencies to act cost-effectively." Letter of P.
Hater, REo. Sept.-Oct. 1981 at 2.
265. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 701(aXl) (1976) with Id § 706(l)(b). But C Comment, EqualEmployment Opportmdtt'es, mpra note 224, at 151.
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rules that the executive imposes on itself.2 66 Moreover, even if this offshoot of the delegation doctrine did not require the executive to impose
limitations on itself,267 when the executive has done so gratuitously,
administrative due process requires it to observe the limitations consistently unless they are merely rules for internal housekeeping. 268 In
either case, the logical corollary is the availability of judicial review of
executive compliance with such limitations. Otherwise "the only prac'2 69
tical restraint would be the self-restraint of the executive branch.
This does not mean, however, that the courts will always decide to
enforce the limitations. The courts may conclude that executive enforcement is adequate or that their own institutional limitations compel
them to withhold review. Nonetheless, it is for the courts, not the executive, to decide when and whether self-imposed executive limitations
should be judicially enforced. 2 70 The courts should therefore reject a
266. See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,443 U.S. 915 (1979). An
executive order required federal contractors to certify their compliance with voluntary wage and
price standards established by the President or to risk being declared ineligible for future government business. The court upheld the validity of the order, which had at best a tenuous nexus to
statutory authority, partly on the grounds that self-imposed "administrative standards exist to test
the President's actions." 618 F.2d at 793 n.51; c.f Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F.
Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (Leventhal, J.). InAmalgamatedMeaf Cutters, the plaintiffs attacked the
constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, pursuant to which the President had
instituted a 90-day price-wage freeze which affected the plaintifl' wage contract. Although the
court found sufficient limits and standards in the Act to sustain it as a valid delegation of legislative authority, another answer to the "blank check" criticism was that
[Amay action taken by the Executive under the law. . . must be in accordance with
further standards as developed by the Executive. This requirement, inherent in the Rule
of Law,... means that however broad the discretion of the Executive at the outset, the
standards once developed limit the latitude of subsequent executive action.
Id at 758.
267. See Brufi supra note 10, at 22-23 (delegation doctrine and the requirement for procedural regularity should be applied cautiously to the President because he, unlike the agencies, is
subject to the check of political accountability). But see Note, JudicialReview ofExecutiveAcion,
supra note 10, at 1545 (because delegations to the President pose threats to the separation of
powers, they bear especially close scrutiny).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 166-83.
269. Flemming v. Moberly Milk Products Co., 160 F.2d 259, 265 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 786 (1947). "Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself will
confine and control the exercise of discretion." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge McGowan of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit has even suggested that judicial review of presidentially-generated rules
may need to be more intensive than review of ordinary agency rules because of the lack of congressional oversight of agency compliance with the former. Proceedngs,.supra note 260, at 249
(statement of Judge McGowan).
270. See United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982). In Wate, the defendant
raised the defense of agency non-compliance with the Carter Order in his prosecution for failing
to register for the draft. The government argued that the enforceability of the Carter Order
against federal agencies was not judicially reviewable. The court emphatically rejected this argument. "Clearly, an Article II court is not proscribed from reviewing the question of the enforce-
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naked executive assertion of preclusion such as that found in the Reagan Order.271
2. Discretiox The True Bar? Even if an executive order that is
not based on statutory authority cannot of its own force preclude judicial review of agency violations of an executive order, the courts could
independently determine that compliance has been committed to the
absolute and' unreviewable discretion of the executive branch.27 2 Behind such a determination of nonreviewability is a balancing of several
factors. The first factor is whether there is "law to apply." This factor
is essentially an analysis of the nature and scope of agency discretion
under the order. Additional factors include judicial ability to perform
review, the probable impact of review on the agency's exercise of discretion, and the availability of alternative administrative means of enforcing agency compliance. 273
In assessing these factors, the proper inquiry is not whether, but to
what extent, agency compliance with an executive order has been cornability of an executive order, i'rerpecdve ofan attempt by the executive branch to make review an
intra-branchfunction." Id at 1387 (emphasis added). The court then ruled, however, that the
nonstatutory order was without force and effect of law and therefore enforceable only in the "discretion of the President." Id. at 1388.
271. Like the President, the Department of Health and Human Resources has also recently
asserted in a proposed rule that the rule "is not intended to create any right or benefit enforceable
at law by a party against the Department." 47 Fed. Reg. 26,860-861 (1982). This attempted preclusion has drawn the fire of the American Bar Association and others. See SECTION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, REPORT TO THE AmmucAN BAR ASSOCIATION, USE OF NOTICE AND
CoMMENT PRocEDuREs By UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES IN

RuLEMAmINO RELATING TO PuBuc PROPERTY, LoANs, GRANTs, BENEFITS AND CONTRAcrs 17
(Aug. 1980). ("We believe that courts should ignore such a statement as an attempt to circumvent
legitimate judicial review"; courts should enforce even self-imposed agency rules and practices
where they deem it appropriate); Letter from Professor P. Schuck, Yale Law School, to C. Lewis,
Department of Health and Human Services (July 30,1982) (an agency "cannot free itself from the
obligation to comply with its own rules... simply by stating that it does not intend that they
create any legal rights enforceable by law.") (copy on file with author).
272. See, eg., Kuhl v. Hampton, 451 F.2d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding unreviewable a
claim of agency non-compliance with Executive Order No. 11,348, concerning non-discrimination
in federal employee promotion and training, because job classifications "at best constitute discretion in administrative procedures which are specifically exempt from judicial review by 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(aX2)-).
273. These factors correspond loosely to those that Saferstein has identified as relevant to the
functional analysis of whether an action is "committed to agency discretion": breadth of agency
discretion, Saferstein, spra note 245, at 380, expertise and experience required to understand
subject matter of agency action, Id at 382; impropriety ofjudicl intervention, Id at 386; quantity
of potentially appealable actions, id at 392; and existence of other means of preventing abuses of
discretion, id at 393; see also G. Leedes, Understanding Judicial Review ofFederalAgencyActilo,
KaJkaesque and Langdeilian, 12 U. RICH. L, REv. 469, 475 (1978).
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mitted to unreviewable discretion. 274 A functional balancing may raise
serious doubts concerning reviewability. Such doubts, however, can
often be resolved by adjusting the scope of review, instead of barring
review altogether. 275
a. Agency Discretion Under the Reagan Order. Although the
foregoing analysis of the merits shows that no statute furnishes "law to
apply" for testing agency discretion in complying with the Reagan Order, the Order itself may provide that law. The "law" needed for judicial review of agency action need not be statutory; agency regulations
and procedures can supply sufficient standards to test agency discretion.276 Even nonlegislative rules and procedures can supply such

"law," provided they do not contemplate such broad discretion as to
277
make review impossible.
The Reagan Order employs the mandatory "shall" in describing
both the reporting and substantive requirements that the agencies must
satisfy. Agencies "shall initially determine" whether a rule is major and
"shall include" that determination in their notice of proposed rulemaking, 278 and the preliminary and final RIs required for major rules

"shall contain" various descriptions and explanations. 279 Similarly, the
agencies "shall adhere" to the Order's substantive requirements and
"shall not" undertake regulatory action unless the action's benefits exceed its costs 28 Except insofar as some discretion is built into the Or274. See, ag., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1051-52 & n.29
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
275. 1d; Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 570 (1975).
276. See, eg., W. G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498, 501 (4th Cir.

1973).
277. See, eg., Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1981);
Ness Investment Corp. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, Forest Serv., 512 F.2d 706, 716-17,
(9th Cir. 1975) (finding "law to apply" in both legislative regulations and nonlegislative Forest
Service Manual). Cases considering whether military decisions are committed to the absolute and
unreviewable discretion of commanders and military boards illustrate the sufficiency of such nonlegislative rules. While the courts have often concluded, after a functional analysis of institutional
factors, that the military action is unreviewable, they have repeatedly emphasized that a claim that
self-imposed regulations or procedures have been violated stands on a footing different from other
claim of error and illegality. See United States ex reZ Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403
F.2d 371,374-75 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.), cert died, 394 U.S. 929 (1969). Such courts have
found "law to apply" in non-legislative service "bulletins," e-g., Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141, 14647 (2d Cir. 1969), and mere unit orders, ag., Schatten v. United States, 419 F.2d 187, 192 (6th Cir.

1969).
278. Reagan Order,

§§ 3(b) & (g)(1), 3 C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982).

279. Id at § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. 129.
280. Id § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 128. In contrast to the agencies, the OMB is simply authorized,
rather than directed, to review the preliminary RlAs and final RIAs submitted to it, to designate
proposed rules as "major," to prepare uniform standards for the identification of major rules and
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der's amorphous qualitative test for designating major rules, 281 the
agencies apparently have no discretion to avoid preparing an RIA for
major rules.
On the other hand, the Order leaves it to the agencies to decide
how to perform such analysis. 282 The agencies implicitly have broad
discretion to identify, quantify, and monetize tangible costs and benefits, to identify and describe intangible costs and benefits, and to generate regulatory alternatives for analysis.2 3 These tasks involve difficult
questions of "social policy and economic forecasting," recognized in
other contexts as entailing a broad measure of agency discretion. 284
Yet the existence of some discretion does not of itself compel a conclusion that agency compliance with the Order is unreviewable. 285 Reviewability still depends on both the scope of that discretion-here
surely limited by the stated purposes of the Order-and the effect of
review on the exercise of that discretion. Moreover, discretion poses no
bar to the review of those provisions of the Order that "identify in
mandatory terms elements that must be included" in RIAs. 28 6

b. JudicialAbiliyto Review Agency Compliance. A second factor
affecting the reviewability of agency action is the courts' ability to perform review. Skepticism about the courts' ability and resources to review RIAs is understandable. Questions of allocative efficiency and
social preference for collective goods, which are raised by RIAs, may
the development of RLAs, to require agencies to obtain and evaluate additional information, to
develop procedures for estimating costs and benefits, and to waive the RIA requirements of the
Order. Id § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 131. The Order also generally authorizes the Director of the OMB to
"monitor" agency compliance with the Order and to establish procedures for performance of the
functions vested in him. Id §§ 6(a)(8) & 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 131. In addition, the Order authorizes the
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief to resolve issues under the Order or to ensure their
presentation to the President, and to "direct" the OMB Director's implementation of the Order.
Id §§ 3(e)(l), (3Xi), 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 129-31.
281. Id § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 127-28.
282. C. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1048, (D.C. Cir. 1978) (interpreting
mandatory language of Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments as denying EPA discretion to avoid cost-benefit balancing, but as conferring "some discretion to decide how it will
perform the cost benefit balancing task").
283. See OLC MEMORANDUM, .spranote 21, at 6; supra note 41.
284. See, eg., Davis Ass'n., Inc. v. Secretary, Hous. and Urban Dev., 498 F.2d 385, 390 (Ist
Cir. 1974). See generaly Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Lines, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958) (suggesting nonreviewability of matters involving "nice issues ofjudgment and choice" on which expets disagrre).
285. See Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.) (broad discretion
"does not lead inevitably to a conclusion that such an exercise of adm trative power is wholly
immune from judicial examination.").
286. Cf Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 608 F.2d, 1319, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussingjudicial review of statutory executive order), cert. doffed, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
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lie beyond the competence of the courts. After all, such questions are
still often beyond the competence of economists.28 Requiring courts to
review matters for which they have neither the expertise nor the staff
could paralyze the review process without improving the quality of regulatory rulemaking. 28 8 This assessment, however, fails to distinguish
between procedural and substantive review and ignores the extent to
which courts already substantively review statutory cost-benefit analysis, a task that they cut to size by limiting the scope of their review.
The reporting provisions of the Reagan Order invite the procedural review, denominated "hard look," that the courts now regularly
use for agency rules promulgated after some form of cost-benefit or
cost-effectiveness analysis.289 The hard look doctrine involves intensive
judicial oversight of the rulemaking process, including the process for
required regulatory analysis. The courts first examine both the sources
and reliability of data employed by the agency in the rulemaking and
any attendant regulatory analysis.290 This feature of hard look review
closely parallels the Reagan29 Order's requirement that rules be based
"on adequate information." 1 Second, the courts insist that the agency
disclose for public comment assumptions and uncertainties underlying
the agency analysis. 292 Third, the courts require the agency to give rea287. See Sunstein, supra note 38, at 1270-72; RegulatoryReform Hearings,supra note 256, pt.
I, at 1057 (testimony of Mark Green). Professor Sunstein suggests that such questions also He
beyond the authority of the courts. Sunstein,supra note 38, at 1271. But this is true only when the
courts seek to impose their own criteria for allocative efficiency, and not when they enforce the
criteria that the executive branch imposes on itself. Of course, the question ofjudicial competency
remains.
288. RegulatoryReform Hearings,supra note 256, pt. 1, at 370 (statement of Chairman Ferris
of the Federal Communications Commission).
289. See DeLong, InformalRulemaking and the IntegrationofLaw andPolicy, 65 VA. L. REV.
257, 265-76 (1979); Rodgers, supra note 37, at 209-10, Rodgers, A HardLookat Vermont Yankee"
Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699, 704-08 (1979) (summarizing hard
look doctrine and the principal environmental rulemaking cases in which it was employed); Note,
RegulatoryAnalyses andJudicialReview ofInformalRulemaking, 91 YALE LJ. 739, 745-46 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Regulatory Analyses].
290. See, eg., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1055 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1977). To the extent that such analysis is dependent upon the cost data
supplied by the industry that will bear the eventual regulatory burden, it is justly subject to particularly close scrutiny for reliability and objectivity. See Regulatory Reform Hearings,supra note
256, pt. 1, at 1069 (statement of Mark Green); U.S. REGULATORY CoUNcil, supra note 16, at 2122; SUBCOMM. ON OvERsIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONs OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOR-

EIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WONDER TOOL OR MIRAGE?
11-16 (Comm. Print 1980).
291. Reagan Order, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982).
292. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The safety valves in
the use of... sophisticated [economic] methodology are the requirement of public exposure of
the assumptions and data incorporated into the analysis and the acceptance and consideration of
public comment, [and] the admission of uncertainties where they exist. . . ."); Southland Mower
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soned responses to significant public comments made during the
rulemaking.293 Again, this requirement tracks the Reagan Order's requirement that an agency determine that the factual conclusions on
which a rule is based have "substantial support" in the agency record,
"with full attention to the public comments in general and the comments of persons directly affected by the rule in particular." 294 Fourth,
the courts insist on exploration of reasonably available alternatives to
the rule under review. 295 The Reagan Order also echoes this feature of
hard look review. In an RIA, an agency must consider alternative approaches to regulatory objectives and describe any alternatives that can
achieve regulatory goals at lower cost.296 Finally, the hard look doctrine emphasizes that the agency must articulate its reasoning and the
rational connection between the data, assumptions, and conclusions it
has drawn.29 In this regard, an. RIA exposes the agency's reasoning
process. An RIA goes beyond the minimal explanation for a rule that
the APA presently requires and evidences that the substantive decision
making process mandated by the Reagan Order has actually taken
place. 298
This summary of some principal features of the hard look doctrine
shows that agency compliance with the reporting requirements of the
Reagan Order is amenable to such procedural review. It also suggests
that this amenability is no accident. Both the hard look doctrine and
the Reagan Order can be viewed as efforts to discipline agency
rulemaking by imposing "internal management standards" on the proCo. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 619 F.2d 499, 525 (5th Cir. 1980) (disclosure of eco-

nomic analysis for public comment entitles the analysis to "presumption of reliability").
293. Compare Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Products Safety Comm'n, 619 F.2d 499,
525 (5th Cir.1980) (agency response to public comment on economic analysis increases judicial
confidence in the reliability of the analysis underlying rule) with Aqua Slide 'N Dive Corp. v.
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831, 842 (5th Cir. 1978) (failure to disclose and
afford public comment on economic analysis prevents its consideration as "substantial evidence").
294. Reagan Order, § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982).
295. See Leventhal, EnvironnentalDecWonMaking andthe Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV.509, 525 (1974). Some commentators have argued that the courts have gone too far in this
regard by requiring the exploration of alternatives that lie beyond an agency's authority. This
criticism, however, does not go to the courts' ability to review such exploration; in this regard,
courts have the same expertise, or lack of it, that the agencies themselves have. See Cramton &
Berg, On Leading aHorseto Water: NEPA & the FederalBureaucracy,71 MicH.L REv. 511, 528
(1973); Rodgers. upra note 289, at 724-26 (noting that courts lack the agencies' parochial hostility
to alternatives that go beyond their mission).
296. Reagan Order, §§ 2(d), 3(dX4), 3 C.F.R. 127-29 (1982).
297. See, ag., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (permitting computer
modeling to satisfy economic analysis requirements so long as the court can discern a "rational
connection between the factual inputs, modeling assumptions, modeling results and conclusions
drawn from these results").
298. See .pra text accompanying note 19.
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cess.299 Both therefore aim to protect those who must bear regulatory
burdens. As the latest executive response to the problem of burdensome regulation, the Order obviously has borrowed from the agency
management standards created by courts in their review of rulemaking.
On the other hand, there is a stronger argument that substantive
review of the adequacy of agency regulatory analysis lies beyond the
ability of the courts. The primitive nature of cost-benefit and related
forms of economic analysis, severe data deficiencies in the measurement of indirect costs and benefits, and the consequent subjectivity of
such cost-benefit analysis (especially in the difficult areas of health,
safety, and the environment) make it very difficult for courts to
or to
"rebalance" costs and benefits in reviewing agency determinations
3 °°
second-guess agency designations of "major" rules.
Yet, the difficulties of substantive review are equally present 30in1
existing judicial review of statutorily required economic analysis.
The courts have responded to these difficulties by calibrating the intensity of review rather than by abdicating review. They employ highly
deferential, "soft glance" review.30 2 With soft glance review, a court
a
upholds an agency's economic balancing so long as it lies within
30 3 Soft
purblind."
or
"obtuse
not
is
and
"zone of reasonableness"
glance review does not contemplate judicial second-guessing of the
quantification of cost and benefits; courts cannot "look behind the fundamental and numerous judgments involved in identifying, classifying,
quantifying, and expressing in present dollar values the effects of a policy action." 30 4 But they can "uncover what is done in the name of cost299. See Delong,supranote 289, at 301-09 ("internal process control"); Note, RegulatoryAnalyse, supra note 289, at 742-49.
300. Leventhal, supra note 295, at 529. The literature on the shortcomings of cost-benefit
analysis is already legion. See ag., Baram, Cost-BeneftAnalysis: An InadequateBassforHealth,
Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisonmakfng, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980); Rodgers,
supra note 37, at 193-201; Sagofi Economic Theory and EnvironmentalLaw, 79 MiCH. L. REv.
1393 (1981).
301. See supra note 37; Rosen, Cost-BenefltAnays4, JudicialReview andthe NationalEnvironment PolicyAct, 7 EwrvrL L.363 (1977) (describing two approaches to substantive review of costbenefit analysis under National Environmental Protection Act); Note, Cost-Bengit Analysis and
the FederalWaterPollution ControlActAmendments of 1972: A ProposalforCongressionalAction,
67 IowA L. REv. 1057, 1061-70 [hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Water Pollution ControlAct

AMedmS].
302. Rodgers, supra note 37, at 216.
303. Leventhal, supra note 295, at 529. See, eg., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Castle, 590 F.2d 1011,
1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding agency cost determinations so long as they fall "within a
broad zone ofreasonable estimate" and emphasizing that cost-benefit balancing need not be made
with "pinpoint precision"); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 656-57 (Ist Cir. 1979)
(accepting agency's "rough idea" of costs and requiring only that they be not "'wholly out of
proportion' to... benefits").
304. Rodgers, supra note 37, at 218.
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benefit analysis, '30 5 insist on identification and classification of the effects of regulatory action, and require a reasonable proportion between
the costs and benefits identified by the agency.
The same deference is appropriate for court review of agency "major rule" designations under the Reagan Order. Courts can require an
agency to identify the probable effects of a proposed rule. In light of
the broad discretion that the Order confers on the agencies in applying
the test for a "major" rule, however, courts must defer to both the agencies' quantification of those effects for substantive purposes of the hundred-million-dollar threshold and the agencies' qualitative assessment
of impacts on particular economic sectors. 3o6 In this regard, substantive review of "major" rule designations is no more exacting than judicial review of agency designations of "major" administrative actions
under the NEPA.3 0
Not surprisingly, courts have found very few agency regulations
invalid because of inadequacies in required economic analyses. 308
Substantive judicial review of cost-benefit analysis by the "soft glance"
approach protects only against extreme analytic abuses by the agency.
Such review should therefore rarely result in reversal of corresponding
agency action.309 The very difficulty of substantive review has driven
some courts to the alternative of hard look procedural review, with the
result that the observable consequences of "substantive" review are al305. Id
306. Reagan Order, §§ l(b)(1), (2), 3 C.F.R. 127-28 (1982).
307. See Leventhal,supra note 295, at 521-23; Regulatory Reform Iearings,supra note 256, pt.
2, at 193-94 (statement of National Construction Industry Council). When an agency's estimate of
a rule's impact is just short of a hundred million dollars, a somewhat less deferential scope of
review may be appropriate in light of the past history of agency manipulation of major rule designations to avoid preparing regulatory analyses. See infra note 333. The courts haVe prior experience with the review of such "scanting" determinations by the agencies under the NEPA.
Leventhal, supra note 295, at 523.
308. See, Note, Fedeal Water Pollution ControlAtAmendmen, supra note 301, at 1061-71
(summarizing the main cases under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 and concluding that substantive challenges have almost always failed).
309. Gellhorn, supra note 262, at 23. The suggestion that "[rieviewing courts, beguiled by the
idea of optimal choice, must struggle to resist finding reversible error in an agency's analytical
process," Diver, PolicymakingParadgms in Admfnistraive Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 428-29
(1981), fails to appreciate the deferential stance courts have taken to date towards the review of
cost-benefit and other forms of economic analysis. Far from being beguiled by notions of optimality in substantively reviewing agency decision making, courts have expressly settled for minimum rationality, rough estimates and crude proportionality. Moreover, Judge McGowan, of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has even suggested that regulatory analyses
will make agency action less vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by underscoring a rule's lack of arbitrariness. McGowan, Regulatory Analysfr and Judicial Review, 42 Onio ST. LJ. 627, 634 (1981).
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most always procedural in nature. 310 Courts rarely, if ever, reject an
agency's analytic determinations; instead, they require the agency
merely to explicate its reasoning and to improve the quality of its information on another attempt at rulemaking. It is unlikely, therefore, that
judicial review of agency compliance with the Reagan Order will paralyze the courts, or, conversely, that inexpert judicial tinkering with
agency economic analysis will paralyze the agencies.
Finally, because the courts already use both hard look procedural
review to enforce internal management standards similar to those established by the Reagan Order and soft glance substantive review, the
incremental burden of reviewing agency compliance with the Reagan
Order would probably be minimal. In fact, the inclusion of RIAs in
the record for review, to the extent that the preparation of an RIA requires an agency to "organize and digest" the rulemaking record "so
that a reviewing court is not forced to scour the four corners of the
record to find that evidence for itself,"31' will conceivably reduce the
existing burden of judicial review of agency action. The RIA can furnish necessary information in a convenient, uniform, and intelligible
format that facilitates both hard look procedural review and soft glance
substantive review by directing, and thereby shortening, judicial search
312
of the rulemaking record.
c. Impact of JudicialReview. A third factor in deciding whether

a claim of agency violation of an executive order is reviewable is the
impact of judicial review on the agency. Arguments against judicial
review of regulatory analysis requirements are that the review would
encourage formalistic agency analysis and delay the already protracted
administrative process. These arguments underestimate the sensitivity
of judicial review, however, and fail to distinguish the impact of executive analytic requirements from the separate and incremental impact of
judicial review of agency compliance with those requirements. More310. Rodgers, upra note 37, at 210 ("While intuition suggests that a legislative model embracing a strict cost-benefit formula might contain an enforceable substantive efficiency standard, the
observable consequences are procedural in nature-requiring better definition, quantification and
a sharper description of alternatives.").
311. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.) (footnote omitted) (Bazelon & McGowan, JJ., concurring), cerl. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
312. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 309, at 634; De Muth, supra note 45, at 22. Although it is

difficult to guage the accuracy of this assessment from judicial opinions, a recent decision setting
aside an agency's rescission of a safety regulation provides some implicit support. The court cites
frequently to the RIA that accompanied the agency action. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
DOT, 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 51 U.S.L.W. 4953 (U.S. June 21, 1983).
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over, the favorable impact that judicial review may have on the agency
rulemaking process blunts these arguments.
Simply stated, the first argument is thit judicial review will divert
attention from the rule itself to the accompanying RIA, thereby
prompting agency staff to prepare RIAs in light of possible litigation
instead of management needs. 313 If courts can review agency compliance with analytic requirements, litigants challenging administrative
regulations will closely scrutinize RIAs in search of minor procedural
violations by the agency. 314 By way of example, proponents of this argument cite judicial review of environmental impact statements under
the NEPA, which is said to have encouraged "bureaucratic gamesmanship, in which newly acquired expertise is devoted not so much to formulating a project that meets the needs of the environment as to
shaping an impact statement to meet the contours of the agency's
' '315
preconceived program and to withstand the test of judicial review.
This argument justifies sensitive review, not the abdication of review.3 16 Soft glance review would not require close scrutiny of an RIA
or insist on precision in the agency balancing of costs and benefits.
Hard look review is more demanding, but like all judicial review of
administrative action, is still subject to the doctrine of prejudicial error.317 A court that reviews sensitively would not overturn an agency

rule for a minor deviation from a procedural requirement. Moreover,
the extent to which agencies prepare "defensive" RIAs is largely a result of the Reagan Order itself; the Order places the RIA in the record
for judicial review and thus makes it part of the court's decision
whether to uphold the final rule even when the court does not purport
to review the RIA as such. The administrative review process alone
also encourages defensive analysis, whether or not the courts review
318
compliance with the Reagan Order.
Furthermore, several positive effects of judicial review partially
offset these potentially negative effects. The real impact of judicial re313. See, eg., Proceedings, supra note 260, at 305 (statement by R. Neustadt, Asst. Director of
the White House Domestic Policy Stafl); Regulatory.JormHearngs,supra note 256, pt. 1, at 208
(testimony of C. Schultze, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors), 381 (testimony of S. King,
Chairperson, Consumer Product Safety Commission).
314. See ReguaoryReform Hearings,supra note 256, pt. 1, at 406 (statement of M. Pertschuk,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission), 381 (testimony of S. King, Chairperson, Consumer Product Safety Commission).
315. Cramton & Berg, sipra note 295, at 516.
316. Note, ReguatoryAnalyer, szqra note 289, at 763.
317. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
318. See Mosher, Reaganfie, wih OMB':List in Hand, Take DeadAim at EFPA' Regulatlonr,
13 NArT'L 256, 258 (1981) (describing conflict between OMB and the agencies that creates "defensive game-playing" by agency regulators).
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view is measured less by the number of cases that actually undergo
review or by the quality of the review thus afforded than by the reaction of the agency bureaucracy to the possibility of review. The prospect of judicial review enhances the bureaucratic leverage of analytic
staff and serves to protect their efforts from non-analytic interference or
pressure. 31 9 Ultimately, therefore, the courts can share some credit
with the analytic requirements that they enforce for any resulting improvement in administrative decision making, as many students of the
NEPA will attest.320 Conversely, without judicial review, agency compliance with the Order and the anticipated improvement in regulatory
decision making will be sporadic because it will depend on the agen-

cies' good

wi]l.321

On the other hand, the argument that agency compliance with the
Reagan Order will delay the rulemakng process is unquestionably correct. The creation of any new ground for judicial review presumptively
lengthens the review process, and industry requests for interlocutory
review of agency compliance with analytic requirements 322 threaten
substantial further delays. Yet, the extent of added delay is exaggerated. Requests for interlocutory review probably will not pass the
threshold barriers of exhaustion and finality and therefore should not
cause delay. 323 A good deal of the delay attributed to judicial review is,
in fact, time spent complying with the Reagan Order. If this delay has
a negative effect on agency functioning, it stems from the Order itself.
In addition, under any circumstances courts will have to review final
agency rules using a record that includes RIAs. It is therefore difficult
to estimate precisely what incremental delay would result from allowing judicial review of agency compliance with the Reagan Order at
the same time. It is at least arguable that the increment would not be
significant. Finally, additional delay in the rulemaking process may
319. See Jaffe, The Right to JudicialReview11, 71 HARV. L. REv. 769 (1958); Pedersen, Formal

Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE LJ. 38, 60 (1975) (judicial review gives "those who
care about well-documented and well-reasoned decision making a lever with which to move those
who do not."); Sofaer JudicialControl of InformalDiscretionary.4djudication and Enforcement, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1356 (1972).

320. See, eg., F. ANDERSON, supra note 18; Cramton & Berg, supra note 295, at 517; Pedersen,
supra note 319, at 77 n.146; Note, RegulatoryAnalyses, supra note 289, at 676.

321. RegulatoryReform Hearingssupra note 256, pt. 2, at 850 (letter of American Consulting
Engineers Council to Senator Ribicoft); id pt. 1, at 627 (statement of Professor Morgan); see also
id pt. 1 at 386 (statement of Senator Cohen).
322. See RegulatoryReorm Hearings,supra note 256, pt. 1, at 959 (testimony of W. McKinley,
representative of Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers), 962 (testimony of J. Joseph, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
323. Id at 1136 (testimony of Judge H. Friendly).
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not be bad. If the delay results in an improved final rule and a reduc324
tion of the accompanying regulatory burden, it should be applauded.
d. The Alternative of AdministrativeEnforcement. The availability of law to apply to a claim that an agency has violated an executive
order does not necessarily mean that courts should apply the law, even
if they are able to do so. The existence of the alternative of administra5
tive enforcement may require a conclusion of nonreviewability. 32
Whether such a conclusion obtains, however, depends on whether that
alternative is effective and whether supplemental judicial enforcement
would be incompatible with administrative enforcement.
Experience furnishes good reason to doubt the efficacy of administrative enforcement of regulatory requirements established by executive orders. Both the Ford and Carter Orders required agency
compliance with standards set by OMB and authorized some degree of
centralized monitoring by OMB. The Ford Order required agencies to
cooperate with the Director of OMB and to "comply with the procedures prescribed" by the Director pursuant to the Order. 326 The Carter

Order required agencies to prepare implementing criteria subject to
OMB approval and directed OMB to "assure the effective implementation of this Order. ' 327 The Carter Order did not indicate how this was
to be accomplished. 328 In addition, President Carter authorized the
Council on Wage and Price Stability and the Regulatory Analysis Review Group to review the content of selected regulatory analyses prepared by the agencies. 329 The essentially hortatory nature of these
provisions for centralized review330 made agency compliance a function of the President's "willingness to exert his political muscle" against
the agencies. 331
324. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, IMPROVED QUALrrY, ADEQUATE RESOURCES, AND
CONSISTENT OVERSIGHT NEEDED IF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IS TO CONTROL THE COSTS OF REG-

app. 1 51 (Nov. 2,1982) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. See Saferstein, supra note
245, at 390.
325. See Saferstein, supra note 245, at 394-95.
326. Ford Order, supra*note22, § 4, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-75 Comp.)
327. Carter Order, supra note 27, §§ 5(b) & (c), 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978 Comp.).
328. Carter Order, supra note 27.
329. Id.
330. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reinforced the hortatory nature of these
orders in Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 235-36 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976). The court denied private enforceability of the Ford Order against the
Department of Agriculture, effectively ruling that agencies could disregard the Order's analytic
requirements without fear ofjudicial reversal. AegudaroryReform Hearings,supra note 256, pt. 1,
at 1203 (statement of C. Carey, President of Nat'l Food Processors Association).
331. See S.Tolchin, PreshdeialPower andthe Politicsof ,ARG, 3 REG., July-Aug. 1979, 44,
15; _f C'
OW'S Review, sjupra note 45, at v-vii.
ULATION
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Although President Carter, at least, exerted such "muscle" on occasion, 332 agency compliance with both the Ford and Carter Orders
was uneven and incomplete. Many agencies escaped the orders' analytic requirements by minimizing cost estimates and segmenting pro-

posed rules to avoid designating them as "major."333 Agency
statements of the problems that regulations addressed and analyses of
alternatives were frequently skimpy or nonexistent. 334 Although both
orders required agencies to identify economic consequences of the proposed regulations, many agencies proved reluctant to draw comparisons between costs and benefits.335 The resulting analyses were
sometimes little more thanpost hoc rationalizations of regulatory approaches chosen in advance of the analysis. 336 This experience amply
demonstrates the necessity for some outside monitoring of compliance
with executive orders. It also suggests the relatively toothless nature of
executive monitoring such as that under the Ford and Carter Orders.
In contrast, the executive review contemplated by the Reagan Order has teeth. In addition to the OMB "pocket veto"-which permits
OMB to delay publication of proposed or final rules until an agency
has adequately responded to criticisms of an RIA--the Order authorizes the OMB to overrule agency determinations of proposed rules as
major or minor and thus to counter a favorite agency avoidance tactic
under the prior orders. 337 While it may be too early to measure the
effectiveness of these enforcement techniques, the Administration, un338
surprisingly, is claiming success.
Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt this claim, apart from the
past resiliency of agency resistance to analytic requirements. 339 OMB
332. Tolchin, supra note 331, at 45.
333. See Baram,.upra note 300, at 503.04; Note, The Inflation Impact Statement Progranm An

Assessment ofthe FirstTwo Years, 26 AM. U.L. Rnv. 1138, 1156 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note,
IIS Assessment]; De Muth, supra note 45, at 21 (under the Carter Order, "a suspiciously large
number of regulations have been projected to cost $90-95 million").
334. U.S. REGULATORY COUNcIL, supra note 16, at 14, 17; Note, 11S Assessment, supra note
333, at 1158.
335. COWPS REv., supra note 45, at 25.
336. Baram, supra note 300, at 523; Eads, Harnessing Regulation. The Evolving.Role of /ite
House Oversight, REG., May-June 1981, at 19, 24 (initial analysis in response to the Ford and
Carter Orders were "designed solely to support regulatory options... [the agencies] had already

chosen and to 'prove' that their proposals actually generated few if any costs").
337. Eads, supra note 336, at 20-21.
338. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BuDGET, ExEcuTivE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT REPORT
ON THE AcTIVITIEs OF THE REGULATORY AGENCIES DURING 1981 (1982) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON Acvrrms].
339. See GAO REPORT supra note 324, at 3-4, app. 1154 ("problems with the quality of regulatory analyses conducted under the old executive order persist in analyses performed under E.O.
12,291."); GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND GUIDANCE NEEDED TO
ACHIEVE REoULATORY REFORM AT DOE 9 (Nov. 6, 1981).
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does not possess either the staff resources or the analytic capabilities to
undertake consistent enforcement of the Order's requirements. Although the Order has substantially expanded its review responsibilities,
the OMB has not correspondingly increased the number of staff experienced in the techniques of regulatory analysis.34 This undercuts the
Administration's claims of success because, according to the present director of the OMB enforcement effort, it was the executive reviewers'
"institutional inability to review more than a few regulations in any
depth" that led to failures of the Carter Administration's regulatory
analysis program. 341 The Administration's emphasis in progress reports on staggering "body counts" of regulations that the OMB has re343
viewed342 strengthens the suspicion that review is still superficial.
Moreover, if the OMB's resources are overburdened, agencies will anticipate this superficial review and will be encouraged to "try to slip a
regulatory change past the White House." 3 "
Even if doubts of the efficacy of administrative enforcement suggest the need for judicial review, however, it is still necessary to show
that judicial review and administrative enforcement are compatible.
Sometimes an executive order contemplates informal enforcement solutions that are not available to the courts and that would be lost by
judicial enforcement. 345 For example, the courts are il-suited to encourage voluntary compliance with an executive order or negotiating
particular questions of compliance, approaches that the OMB can use
under the Reagan Order.346 In addition, to the extent that the Reagan
340. Eads, supra note 336, at 22-23; Mosher, supra note 318, at 256 (quoting former assistant
EPA administrator for planning and management as saying that "OMB doesn't have the expertise
to second-guess the professional staffs of the agencies."); Cf Mayer, Regulatory CampaignFalters,
Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1982, at HI, col 3.
341. De Muth, supra note 45, at 21.
342. See REPoRT ON Ac'rlVmssupra note 338. Letter ofG. Eads, REo., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 3
(OMB's "attention has increasingly focused on generating regulatory 'body counts.'... Mean-

while, original naalysis by the White House staff has virtually ceased ...
343. GAO REPORT, supra note 324, at 7, app. 1 31, 53.
344. Eads, supra note 336, at 23.
345. Stewart & Sunstein, PublicPrograms and PrivateRights, 95 HARv. L. Ray. 1193, 1319
n.503 (1982); V. Stevens v. Carey, 483 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1973) (emphasizing an executive
order's clear preference for informal resolution of violations of the order, in dismissing purely
private action on jurisdictional grounds); Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632-33
(5th Cir.) (emphasizing an executive orders preference for voluntary and negotiated compliance,
in denying private enforceability against private parties), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Traylor
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871, 875 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sunstein, Section 198) and the
Private Enforcement ofFederalLaw, 49 U. C. L Rav. 394, 434 (1982).
346. The Order also provides for informal resolution of disputes between OMB and the agencies by the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. Reagan Order § 3 (e)(1), 3 C.F.R. 127,
129 (1982). See, ag., Masters,Agencies to Take Label Rule to Reg. Task Force, Legal Times of
Washington, Jan. 11, 1982, at 1, col 4.
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Order is an experiment in the reform of administrative rulemaking,
flexible and somewhat ad hoc administrative enforcement is a way of
varying the experiment to obtain the widest range of observations. 4 7
Because courts enforcing the Reagan Order would not enjoy the same
flexibility as the OMB in choosing among the Order's requirements,
they could severely limit the experiment.
Limiting rather than withdrawing judicial review arguably can accommodate these concerns. The courts could employ deferential soft
glance review for those substantive issues most amenable to informal
resolution. Such supplemental judicial enforcement would leave room
for more flexible and informal administrative enforcement. Hence, the
need for flexibility and informality in enforcement does not by itself
suggest nonreviewability.
Another possible drawback of judicial enforcement lies in the fact
that executive orders require centralized and coordinated enforcement,
while courts offer only piecemeal, ad hoc, and decentralized enforcement . 48 The theoretical importance of coordinated enforcement is apparent from the language of the Reagan Order. The Order aims in part
at the minimization of "duplication and conflict of regulations." 349 Not
only does it require agencies to take account of "other regulatory actions contemplated for the future" in their rulemaking but it also authorizes the Director of the OMB to "[ildentify duplicative, overlapping
and, in such cases, to "require appropriate interand conflicting rules"'350
agency consultation.
This would be a strong argument for withholding review, however,
only if OMB's efforts at coordinated enforcement were demonstrably
effective. In fact, there is little evidence of such efficacy. The General
Accounting Office reports that OMB has neither coordinated regulatory activity nor made any systematic effort to identify conflicts be35
tween regulations which it reviews pursuant to the Reagan Order. '
Instead, OMB's resource constraints have apparently resulted in the review of each major rule in isolation.
347. Cf Shane,supra note 25, at 1264. GAO REPORT, supra note 324, at 9 (regulatory analysis

requirement should be fully implemented before Congress authorizes expanded judicial
oversight).
348. See Sunsteinsrupra note 38, 1270-71;f National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n
of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1974) (identifying the need for coordinated decision
making about the discontinuance of passenger trains as a reason for denying an implied private

right of action).
349. Reagan Order, Preamble, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
350. Id §§ 2(e), 6(a)(5), 3 C.F.R. 128, 131 (1982).
351. GAO REPRT, upra note 324, at 4, app. H 51; #. Deregulation HQ supra note 36, at 21.
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The third and most serious argument for incompatibility lies in the
prospect of a direct confrontation between the executive and judicial
branches over agency compliance with the Reagan Order. Such a confrontation would present the apparent anomaly of the courts enforcing
the President's own policy over his objection. It could also raise a serious separation of powers question because of the direct role that the
Office of the President plays in administrative enforcement. 352 This argument against reviewability of agency compliance with the Reagan
Order carries special force if the Order is viewed as a legitimate tool for
353 Juthe political control of the rulemaking process by the President.
dicial review of compliance with the Reagan Order would emphasize
procedural regularity and analytic rationality to the exclusion of political discretion in a way that could impair the President's ability to
assert political control over administrative rulemaking. 354 This incompatibility would be most strikingly presented if a court enforced the
requirements of the Reagan Order in a situation in which the OMB has
355
waived them to permit a politically favored rulemaking to proceed.
This is a serious objection to judicial enforcement of the Reagan
Order's requirements. It is not, however, an objection that compels removing questions of agency compliance from judicial review altogether. First, the mere involvement of the Office of the President in
enforcement of the Reagan Order is not by itself a sufficient reason for
withdrawing this matter from judicial review.
There should ... be no rule which automatically bars a judicial test

of validity simply because the machinery of the Presidency is implicated. The test ofjudicial competence should be the character of the
question, its amenability to judicial consideration, rather than merely
352. See Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(judicial functions "do not include policing the faithful execution of Presidential policies by Presidential appointees"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Jaffe, supra note 319, at 778.
353. See Eads, .mpranote 336, at 25; Sunstein, supra note 38, at 1276 (Order could be understood "not as an effort to adopt an economic conception of the regulatory process, but as a convenient method of ensuring that regulatory choices-however they are made-reflect the preferences
of high-level executive officials"). Some have argued that such political considerations are legitimate, indeed central, considerations in administrative rulemaking and involve discretion that is
not reviewable by the courts. see, ag., Scalia, Awdemaking as Politics, 34 AD. L. REv. vii-ix
(1982); Cramton & Berg, supra note 295, at 533; cf Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (concluding that informal rulemaking was not intended to be "a rarified technocratic
process, unaffected by political considerations or the presence of Presidential power").
354. Scalia, supra note 353, at vi-ix; see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("Presidential prodding" may affect the rulemaking outcome "in a way the courts could not
police").
355. C Eadssupranote 336, at 24-25 (Order presents the Administration with the temptation
"to give each analysis only cursory review and then either permit the rulemakings to proceed if the
analysis reflects politically desired results or bounce it [sic] back if it does not.").
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the fact that presidential intervention is ultimately possible, or even
that direct routine presidential action is involved. 356
These are the same factors, noted above, that weigh in favor of review
of limited scope. Second, political control of the rulemaking process
may not be a legitimate purpose of the Reagan Order.3 5 7 If such control is not a legitimate purpose, then the courts' inability to take account of the exercise of political discretion and their resulting
"technocratic" focus is not a reason for withdrawing review. On the
contrary, such apolitical judicial review may be necessary to legitimize 358 what is otherwise, to some, a legally suspect assertion of presidential power,359 judicial insistence on procedural regularity and
analytic rationality may provide an antidote to potential political manipulation of the Order's requirements.
The availability of administrative enforcement by the Office of the
President, however, is still a factor counseling cautious and deferential
review. A balancing of this factor with the three factors discussed
above suggests four levels of judicial review of agency violations of the
Reagan Order. Which level is appropriate depends on whether and
what action has been take by the OMB.
First, in the unlikely case that an agency has by-passed the OMB,
the court should set aside the agency's final rule until the agency follows the administrative review process mandated by the Order. A
broad scope of review is appropriate because the court is deciding only
the simple factual question of whether the agency reported its regulatory action to OMB, and the court's intervention complements administrative enforcement by intercepting agency actions that otherwise
escape that enforcement.
Second, when an agency concludes regulatory action on the basis
of the Reagan Order's requirements before it is required to report to
the OMB, 36° the courts should take a hard look at the agency's application of the Order's procedural requirements and a deferential, soft
glance at the agency's application of the Order's substantive require356. Jaffe, supra note 319, at 781.
357. See supra note 23. Even the Orders defenders have conceded that the legitimate application of the Order may be narrower than has generally been supposed and confined to statutes that
themselves embody efficiency criteria. See, eg., Sunstein, supra note 38, at 1280. They have also
acknowledged a potential for executive abuse of the Order to displace discretion that is statutorily
committed to the agencies. Shane, supra note 25, at 1242.
358. See Bruff, supra note 10, at 56 (concluding that less deferential scope of review of presidential action is warranted when that action "nears the substantive constitutional or statutory
limits on his power") (footnote omitted); Mahinka, The Problemof.Nonreviewabiliy: JudicialControl of Action Committedto Agency .Discretion, 20 VILL L. REV. 1, 39 (1974).
359. See Rosenberg, supra note 23; ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 23.
360. Such agency action may, of course, pose problems of review beyond those that are unique
to the Reagan Order. See authorities cited upra note 20.
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ments. Because OMB has not had the opportunity to enforce the Order's requirements, judicial enforcement in accordance with the court's
review would not be incompatible with executive
ability to perform
enforcement.3 61
Third, and more commonly, when the OMB has approved and the
agency has promulgated a major rule, or when the OMB has disapproved and the agency has rescinded or abandoned a major rule as a
result, the courts should set aside the agency action, if at all, only for a
clear, substantial, and unexplained departure from the Order's requirements. In such cases the administrative enforcement mechanism has
operated. A court should not therefore substitute its judgment for that
of OMB or even take a soft glance at the agency's compliance with the
Order because of the risk of incompatibility between judicial and administrative enforcement. On the other hand, a court arguably should
intervene to keep the agency and the OMB "honest" when obvious and
serious violations of the Reagan Order are involved. The OMB purports to be applying the requirements of the Order and not to be making a purely political decision; therefore, a reviewing court would only
3 62
be looking for clear error in agency action by the same standard.
Finally, when the OMB has waived the requirements of the Order,
the courts should withhold review. In such cases, the OMB does not
purport to be applying the requirements of the Order, and judicial insistence on the requirements would nullify the Order's waiver provision. Moreover, the Order supplies no other "law to apply" for
reviewing waivers, and there is no RIA or other record upon which to
3 63
conduct such review.

The result may be to encourage the "political" use of waivers (and
perhaps their use in place of approvals by OMB), 364 but this is the least
offensive exercise of political discretion under the Order. Waiver sim361. But see GAO REPORT, supra note 324, at app. 1 50 (OMBoften has an input to the
development of a rule before it is formally submitted to OMB). Judicial review of the resulting
agency action poses some risk of incompatibility with such informal OMB involvement in an
aborted rulemaking, but it is not incompatible with the formal OMB enforcement process because

that process has not been invoked.
362. See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1332 (9th Cir. 1979) (because action for
judicial review of agency failure to carry out executive order asks "only that the court review the
government's own... effort against the standards established by the executive order and regulations," review is appropriate), ce detned, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).

363. The General Accounting Office reports that OMB has not published any criteria for
waivers and has not adequately explained or, in many cases, even tried to explain its reasons for
waiving the Reagan Orders requirements for particular regulations. GAO REPoRT, .upra note
324, at 4, app. II 52.
364. But see GAO REPoRT, supra note 324, at 4 (OMB already uses its waiver power

liberally).
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ply lets the agency proceed with a rulemaking as if the Order had never
been issued. OMB disapproval of rules that are consequently rescinded
or abandoned by the agency presents the greatest potential for abuse of
political discretion under the Order. In such cases, a narrow scope of
review arguably is appropriate. Of course, the suggested scope may be
so narrow that it is in most cases all but tantamount to withholding
review of agency violations of the Order. But judicial intervention as a
result of such violations should be rare. It is ultimately the possibility,
not the frequency, of judicial intervention in extreme cases that is a
tonic to rational rulemaking and perhaps also a toxin to political
abuses of the Order.
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing conclusion--that judicial review of generally narrow scope should be available for claims that agencies have violated
the Reagan Order--turns on close questions of reviewability. Courts
could reasonably decide these questions the other way or, in many

cases, avoid these questions by invalidating agency action on the basis
of enabling statutes instead of the Order's requirements. But the case
made here for judicial review is less important for its conclusion about
the Reagan Order than for the general framework it suggests for analyzing whether and when courts should review agency violations of
managerial executive orders.
Although courts that have been asked to grant such review have
properly distinguished orders that rest on specific statutory authority
from those which do not, too often they have gone no further. Like a
legislative regulation, an executive order that rests on specific statutory
authority has the force and effect of law. Such an order therefore binds
agencies and the public alike. It does not follow, however, that a managerial executive order that lacks specific statutory authority cannot
also bind agencies.
First, a managerial executive order can derive the force and effect
of law from independent executive lawmaking authority in which Congress has acquiesced, or, more rarely (and arguably only in cases of
national emergency) from such authority standing alone, in the absence
of congressional disapproval. Alternatively, such an order can bind the
non-independent agencies under the doctrine that agencies must follow
their own rules. This is true unless the order is properly classified as a
"mere housekeeping" rule, the violation of which neither deprives individuals of procedural benefits or protections on which they have relied
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nor impairs the administrative decision making process to their
detriment.
Whether a court reaches the merits of these theories depends on a
plaintiff's ability to satisfy the threshold requirements of jurisdiction,
standing, a cause of action, and reviewability. In applying the first
three, a court must look both to the managerial executive order and
beyond it to the agency action that allegedly violated the executive order. By treating the executive order itself or the constitutional authority behind it as the law under which the case arises, the plaintiff may be
able to establish federal question jurisdiction. Alternatively, jurisdiction to hear the claim that an agency violated the order will often lie
within, or append to, independent jurisdiction for judicial review of the
agency action.
To establish standing, a plaintiff who satisfies the constitutional
injury in fact requirement may be able to show that he falls within the
zone of interests protected by a managerial executive order. Alternatively, if the plaintiff has independent standing under a statute to obtain judicial review of an agency action, he may be able to assert any
ground for the action's invalidity, including the agency's violation of a
managerial executive order.
A plaintiff who claims that an agency has violated an executive
order need not argue that the order creates a cause of action for violation. The APA creates a general cause of action for judicial review of
final agency action that injures a plaintiff. The theory of the APA
cause of action is simply that the agency has arbitrarily and capriciously violated its "own" rule, or that the agency has not acted in accordance with the law of the executive order in cases in which the order
carries the force and effect of law.
Reviewability poses the remaining obstacle to judicial review of
agency compliance with an executive order. Although a managerial
executive order may purport to preclude judicial review, it is for the
courts to decide when and whether self-imposed executive limitations
should be judicially enforced. In deciding those questions, courts must
balance such practical factors as the nature and scope of agency discretion under the executive order, the courts' ability to review violations of
the order, the probable administrative impact of judicial review, and
the alternative of administrative enforcement of the order.
The common judicial assertion that it is primarily the function of
the executive branch to fashion remedies for agency violations of
agency rules reflects the substantial weight that the last factor carries in
the balancing. Yet the proper weight of this factor depends on the effi-
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353

cacy of executive enforcement and its compatibility with judicial enforcement. Moreover, reviewability is a question of the extent to which
review should be withheld. Accordingly, a balancing of the relevant
factors will often indicate that a court should narrow the scope of review instead of refusing to review claims that agencies have violated
executive orders.
The notion that the courts have no business reviewing agency violations of the "personal" policies of the President offends the principle
of the rule of law when those policies, directly or indirectly, substantially affect private interests. The traditional framework of administrative law and judicial review of administrative action can and should be
applied to make agencies follow orders, as long as courts give appropriate consideration to the authority with which the orders are issued, the
nature of the obligations that they impose on the agencies, and the role
of the executive in enforcing them.

